


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**COMPULSORY SERVICE**





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# COMPULSORY SERVICE

A STUDY OF THE QUESTION IN  
THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE

BY GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY THE  
RIGHT HON. R. B. HALDANE

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
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## INTRODUCTION

INTEREST in the question of compulsory military service in these islands is very general, and it is important that materials for forming a judgment on the subject should be before the public. I have therefore thought it right to publish a memorandum written for me by one who has very recently held the position of Adjutant-General—Sir Ian Hamilton. It is an unofficial document, originally prepared for my private information, and it does not profess to do more than record the conclusions about various alternatives to the existing system at which he has individually arrived, after study of facts and figures which came before him during the period of his work as Adjutant-General.

For the information of the lay reader, I may mention that the work of organising the British Army at headquarters is one which is carefully distributed. The General Staff plans out the scheme of the various

## 10 THE ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY

forces on the basis of preparation for war; determines the number, structure, and proper size or establishment of the cadres in war, and the purposes and standard of their equipment, accessories, and weapons. These last are supplied by the Quartermaster-General and the Master-General of the Ordnance. To the Department of the Adjutant-General falls, among other duties, that of finding and organising in peace the men to fill the cadres which the General Staff demands for war. These cadres may be on paper the best in the world, but their reality depends on whether it is possible to get recruits, adequate in number and in quality, to fill them. To an Adjutant-General, therefore, the idea of compulsory service is naturally an attractive one. He looks with envy on the easy fashion in which cadres are filled in Germany, France, and Switzerland. He thinks of the physical training and habits of exactness which compulsory service makes general.

But, as a great critic of life has told us, he who acts on only one maxim is a pedant and spoils things for himself and for others. The Adjutant-General of the British Army has more than one thing to consider, and he must resist temptations into which the

abstract mind is prone to fall. He has to approach the proposition to fill cadres by compulsion, even for preliminary training, with anxious regard to certain peculiarities which are characteristic of the British Army, and of it alone among the armies of the world. What he has never to lose sight of is that the little islands on which we live are the centre of an enormous and scattered Empire, the parts of which are separated by great stretches of ocean from the parent islands and from each other. No other nation possesses this peculiar feature to anything approaching the same extent. It is therefore no accident or result of haphazard conjecture, but rather a deep-seated instinct, that has, for generations past, led our rulers and our sailors and soldiers to base their strategy on a principle to which they have held tenaciously. It is that, first in the order of importance comes sea-power, backed up not only by adequate over-sea garrisons, but by an expeditionary army, kept at home in time of peace, but so organised that it is ready for immediate transport by the fleet to distant scenes of action, and is capable of there maintaining long campaigns with the least possible dislocation of the social



## 12 THE ENGAGEMENT TO SERVE OVER-SEA

life of the nation. Such an expeditionary army is essentially a long-range weapon and can be raised only on a long-service basis.\* Those who compose it must therefore accept the Service as their profession for some years, and with it the obligation to embark without any delay. Modern conceptions of mobilisation preclude any idea that time will be available for a search for those willing to go. The undertaking must be a term of service agreed to from the very first day the recruit joins. Sir Ian Hamilton's conclusion is that it is only from a volunteer recruit who proposes to make the Army his profession that we can successfully ask for such an undertaking.

It is customary to speak of the British Army as a very small one. But for purposes of comparison like must be compared with like. Our Home-Defence Army ought, for reasons which I will develop later on, to be small relatively to that of continental

\* By long service, I do not here mean the pre-Cardwell system, under which soldiers served in the ranks until they were pensioned, but a system under which men continue in the ranks long enough (six or seven years) to give a fair period of service abroad after they have been fully trained, and thereafter serve a further period (six or five years) in the Army Reserve, liable to be called up and sent abroad in a national emergency.

nations. This is a further result of our geographical conditions. The Home frontiers of this country are not land but sea frontiers. But considerations of strategy require that the other force, which is raised for the purpose of service over-sea, should be relatively greater than would suffice for other nations that have not, to anything approaching the same extent, to reinforce distant over-sea outposts. As the result, it is in point of fact enormously larger than the similar forces of Germany and France put together. These countries have not had our obligation in this respect, but they have had a quite different obligation, under which they have fashioned their armies on another principle. Their main anxiety is as to how they may best defend open land frontiers; and to this end they have found that the only adequate means is to subordinate all other considerations to that of organising the nation through compulsory service into a huge short-service Army. Their ordinary citizens are trained thoroughly as soldiers, but in reality with a view only to serving in a brief though colossal campaign which must be brought to a decision comparatively speedily; and are passed to the Reserve as soon as their

training is finished. When war breaks out, the cost of keeping such an army mobilised is enormous. Not only the outlay on pay and equipment, but the indirect cost arising from dislocation of industry and civil life generally, is such that these campaigns speedily end in exhaustion, and the final question is as to which nation, by the perfection of its military organisation, can count on wearing out the other before it itself collapses. Such national armies are therefore in substance, and of necessity, short-service armies, and weapons adapted only for operations at short range. What, for the purposes of the present question, is of importance is that, as Sir Ian Hamilton shows, they preclude that other sort of army, which is essential for long-range operations over-sea, from being raised alongside of them out of the same material.

But just because Great Britain is not compelled to maintain enormous armies for the defence of its home frontiers against invasion, it can organise a relatively very large over-sea professional force, and keep it, even in peace time, not only in being but in a high state of training, and fit to serve for a prolonged campaign without exhausting the country in either men or



money. We have nearly 76,000 British soldiers in India, and some 37,000 in other over-sea garrisons. We possess at home, in addition, the Expeditionary Army, the annual training of which now culminates regularly in the autumn manœuvres, and with which the public has thus become familiar. This force mobilises, with its accessories and Army troops, at a figure of about 170,000. In other words, we recruit and maintain a professional long-range army of nearly 300,000, and we are able to do so because our geographical position leaves us free to concentrate on this. We accomplish the result on the only basis on which it can be accomplished—by making service in the Army a voluntary profession.

One of the advantages which followed on the foundation by Mr. Balfour of the Committee of Imperial Defence was that the subjects assigned to that Committee began to be systematically and scientifically studied. The Committee affords to the Chiefs of the Staff at the Admiralty and at the War Office a meeting-place where they have a constant opportunity of bringing their operations into harmony, and of working out in detail objects and principles, common to both Services, which are to be

followed by those who serve under them. But the Committee does more than this. Recently it has developed the scope of its procedure. The Foreign and Colonial Offices, the India Office, the Home Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade, and the Post Office are now, not only through their Ministerial Chiefs, but in the persons of the permanent heads of departments, called into council whenever occasion renders it useful. The organisation works largely through carefully chosen sub-committees, of which several are always sitting and collecting and investigating materials. When the main body assembles the Prime Minister presides, having summoned not only the permanent members, but colonial statesmen who may be in London and are concerned in the particular problem of defence which is under investigation. More and more each year the Committee is being transformed into a body, of which the Prime Minister is the controlling head, but which works mainly through experts. The Sub-Committees, which report to the main body, deal with work much of it so highly technical that it is necessarily carried out by experts. This work the highly qualified secretary, Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Ottley

and his special staff, arrange, under the eye of the Prime Minister. With the Admiralty and the War Office the Secretary is in daily communication. The Defence Committee thus organised contains the germ of a Great General Staff for the Empire. The Admiralty consults it on problems that are more than merely naval. The Imperial General Staff of the Army is in constant relation with it over matters that concern the defences of the Empire. The Committee has now become a body which is in effect sitting and working, largely through the medium of its sub-committees and officials, almost as continuously as is the General Staff of the Army. If war were threatened it could develop into a War Council for the Prime Minister, the duty of which would be to furnish him, and through him his Ministers, with the expert knowledge required before policy could be settled in the Cabinet. It is a body the function of which is to study in time of peace, as a Great General Staff ought, possible situations with a view to the nation and the Empire knowing what to do should war come. Whenever the day arrives at which Mr. Balfour is again its head I think he will find that the organisation which he founded



has developed under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Asquith as nearly as could be along the lines he originally laid down. Continuity in organisation for defence is a great advantage, and the leaders on both sides have been loyal to each other in insisting on it.

Now, one of the most useful contributions which this Great General Staff of the Empire has made to the problem of Home Defence in particular is the laying down of fundamental principles with great distinctness. First under Mr. Balfour, and again under Mr. Asquith, certain conclusions have, after prolonged investigation and examination of expert opinion, been affirmed and re-affirmed. I will set out the substance of these conclusions as they have been indicated by Mr. Balfour, Mr. Asquith, and others in Parliament.

The primary proposition is that command of the sea is the essential foundation of our strategy, not only for Imperial but for Home defence. The Navy undertakes to protect British shores from invasion on a great scale. Writing as a layman who has had the duty of endeavouring to weigh the statements on the question made by the only people whose opinions are of real weight

on this point, the responsible representatives of the Navy, I add here that I have reason to believe that the Admiralty is to-day in a position to make this undertaking good, and, if we do not in our policy stray away from first principles, and divert our resources into a wrong direction, I see no reason to doubt that the ability to afford this protection will continue. Moreover, the undertaking of the Admiralty extends to this, that on existing lines of policy the guarantee will be made good without tying to these coasts ships which are required for command of more distant waters. Our first and fundamental duty in the organisation of our defences is thus to keep the Navy at such a strength as will maintain this strategical position. Although my immediate connection is with the Army, I call this our basic principle. It is the clear outcome of accepted premises that it should be so, and, looking to our geographical position, it is vital that the Army and the Navy should be organised with this conclusion in clear view. When, therefore, expansions of the Army for Home defence purposes are proposed which would add largely to the Estimates, the first question I ask is whether those who propose them are holding firmly, in spirit as well as in words, to the basic

principle, or whether the new expenditure would have as its tendency, intentional or unconscious, to trench upon what is requisite for the maintenance of the proper standard of sea-power.

The second conclusion is that to make the Navy an effective weapon we require a military instrument capable of being used in conjunction with it. This must not be a mere force for Home defence. The true strategical foundation of all adequate defensive preparations is the power of rapidly assuming the offensive by striking wherever a blow will be most effective, it may be at some distant point in the enemy's organisation. To this end a highly trained army for over-sea work is for us essential, an army such as can be raised only on a professional and therefore voluntary footing. Such an army can never be large compared with those that can be raised for the mere purpose of domestic defence. But with us it is and ought to be much larger than the over-sea force of any inland nation with comparatively little to garrison abroad, whose military strength has to be developed and concentrated in the shape of an army to guard land frontiers capable of being guarded in no other way.



It follows inevitably that in shaping our military preparations for Home defence we must bear in mind the purpose to which they are shown by these two conclusions to be limited. A first-line army for Home defence we do not want. The first line here is composed of the divisions of the Fleet in Home waters and the flotillas of destroyers and submarines which guard our coast-line. These we have to keep at such a strength that they can afford adequate protection against the advent of hostile transports. But it is at least conceivable that some hostile transports may succeed in evading the observing fleet, to the extent of landing a force of moderate dimensions or a series of small detachments. That such attempts at landing are, by reason of wind and weather, very uncertain and very difficult operations of war, the experience of the Territorial Manœuvres of this autumn shows. But they may succeed; and in a matter of such vast importance the risk must be provided for. Therefore, although the Admiralty accepts the duty of maintaining the command of the seas which surround our coasts, a second line of security is required against forces which are small enough to have a chance of slipping through—a

second line that can fulfil the double function of being able either to deal with such forces if they do arrive, or to compel the enemy to send them in such magnitude that they cannot escape the Fleet. The method approved by the Defence Committee for this purpose is to raise and train a citizen force which will be greatly superior in numbers to any force that can slip through, and will drive the adversary on to the other horn of the dilemma—that of his transports becoming the target for a superior navy.

It does not matter how secretly or how swiftly the enemy could, in his own territory, and with a view to crossing the sea, bring his troops to the ports of embarkation. Wireless telegraphy, the vigilance of those who live by watching indications that affect the Money Market, and other reasons besides, make, it is true, even the most admirably planned of such operations difficult of execution without warning. The real question is, however, one for seamen. Those who desire to learn what the transport across the ocean of a force of, say, 70,000 means; what sort of target the transporting vessels and their convoys would present, and what are the difficulties in point of place, time, and weather of the process, will find light upon

them in an article which appeared in *The Contemporary Review* for February 1909 under the signature "Master Mariner."

This expert seaman calculates that an invading force of 70,000 men—with horses, guns, and transport—would need at least 150 vessels of sorts, or about 200,000 tons of shipping. Three or four days would, in his opinion, be required to get the troops on board; one or two days to get the ships clear of the harbours; and another two or more days would be needed for the passage. Allowing two days for news of such a venture to leak out, our Admiralty would thus get at least five days' notice of a threatened attack. The convoy of ships would, he estimates, cover at least twenty miles from van to rear, and would throw up smoke visible for another ten to fifty miles. On arrival off our coasts, the business of getting the ships in their proper places and rightly anchored would, he says, be "a colossal task far exceeding anything of the kind ever attempted before." Even given fair weather throughout, and assuming that there was no opposition afloat or ashore—"an assumption that no seaman will concede"—the writer concludes that three weeks would elapse from the first move



## 24 FUNCTION OF THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

in the game to the day on which the invading army would be ready to advance inland.\*

The question whether the Admiralty are right in the view they take, that the transports of a force of probably a great deal less than 70,000 could not escape them, is essentially a naval one. It has been closely considered in the Defence Committee, and the answer is that if the force exceeds 70,000 the operation has no chance of success. But, if so, then all that has to be done is to provide against a force of 70,000 at the outside, and against those small and subsidiary operations of war called raids, whose purpose is the secondary one of effecting, not a great defeat, but disturbance and damage.

For the fulfilment of this purpose the Territorial Force is being organised. Only those who know what ground has to be covered in the construction of a field army of fourteen divisions and of fourteen mounted brigades can appreciate how large and how long an operation this is. It is all very well to criticise. Differences of opinion as to how

\* It must not be assumed that the General Staff adopts this conclusion as the basis of its preparations. In plans providing for risks of such supreme importance the factor of safety always is made large and always ought to be so.

best to proceed and where and to what extent money has to be spent, will abound. Mistakes on the part of those responsible there are certain to be. But with time and patience these difficulties will be got over, and the mistakes will be corrected, provided only the public care sufficiently. And if the conclusions of the Defence Committee to which I have referred have been genuinely adopted by the country as its policy, then it seems to me that this nation, sensible and wise as it has proved itself to be in practical matters, will do what is necessary in providing the men. The Force has been in legal existence for little over two years, and, though practically nothing but the Infantry and Yeomanry existed at the beginning, it has already attained to five-sixths of the numbers of its establishment. It is large enough for further valuable developments of its training. Surely the wise course for doubters is to do what they can to assist its further growth, rather than to indulge in discouraging criticism. The reports on this year's training show not only that definite progress has been made, even in the case of the Artillery, but that the volunteer citizen soldier—with whom his work is a labour of love—has been putting in training

in excess of what the Regulations require of him. There are many difficulties still to be overcome; there is much to be accomplished, in the light of the experience which even two years has given us, in the way of effecting improvements in certain directions. But, if there is steady persistence, there seems to be good ground to hope that the Force will before very long attain to its full establishment and become efficient up to the standard that is necessary. To the standard of our very highly trained Regulars the Territorials, notwithstanding their keenness and intelligence, cannot hope to attain, at all events on this side of the outbreak of serious war and a long embodiment. But it is equally untrue, as Sir Ian Hamilton points out, to say that they can never be expected to take the field until after six months embodied training following on mobilisation. That amount of training, and probably more, would be requisite were we asking them to be ready to hold their own against picked Regulars whom they met in equal numbers and on equal terms. But it is not too much to say that, if the present rate of progress in training continues, the Force, stiffened with a small number of Regular units and a much larger number of Special Reserve and



surplus Regular soldiers who would remain at home even were the expeditionary force all gone abroad, would be a formidable barrier in the path of any invading force that had succeeded in escaping the Navy. On a general mobilisation the Territorials ought automatically to be embodied under the Act of 1907, and before the whole of the Expeditionary Force could have left us they would be well on with their embodied training. Therefore, although it would not be prudent to dismiss the Territorials from that training back to their homes before six months had elapsed, it is a fallacy to say, as is sometimes said, that for six months they would be a non-existent or negligible defence to the country.\*

\* It may be convenient to state here the numbers and organisation of the forces normally at home and available for meeting a sudden invasion.

As regards numbers, there were serving at home on October 1, 1910, under legal liability for service in war :

	Officers	Other ranks
Regulars serving .. ..	6,655	121,892
Regular Reserve (after making necessary deductions) ..	2,000	128,585
Special Reserve .. ..	1,973	61,116
Territorial Force (including Per- manent Staff) .. ..	11,992	259,595

In addition there will, in future, be the men of the Territorial Force Reserve and of the Veteran Reserve ;

Such are the principles for guarding these islands from invasion which have been worked out under the supervision of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Such is the citizen army which is being organised under the eye of the General Staff, in compliance with the principles so laid down. Its function is to compel an enemy attempting invasion to face the dilemma of either having his force destroyed at sea, or of having any part of it that has a chance of slipping past the British Navy surrounded

both these Reserves being at present in their infancy. The men of these Reserves will be available to fill up any shortages in Territorial cadres and for other purposes. As regards the Veterans, these are men who exist in large numbers. They have passed out of the Regular Reserve and are highly trained, and many of them are still between thirty and forty years of age.

As regards units, there exist in the United Kingdom the following :

**Cavalry and Yeomanry :**

Regular regiments	..	..	..	..	17
Irish Horse	..	..	..	..	2
Yeomanry regiments	..	..	..	..	56
					<u>75</u>

**Mobile Artillery :**

Regular service batteries (horse, field, and heavy)	..	..	..	..	101
Territorial batteries (horse, field, heavy, and mountain)	..	..	..	..	182
					<u>283</u>

by greatly superior numbers and worn to pieces.

Whether we succeed in making the system thus planned complete and effective at all points seems to me now to depend on the spirit of the nation itself. That the men required are available, and are willing to make the requisite effort, does not seem to

**Infantry :**

Guards battalions	..	..	..	..	8
Regular battalions	..	..	..	..	74
Special Reserve battalions	..	..	..	..	101
Territorial battalions (including Cyclist bat-					
talions)	..	..	..	..	204
					<u>387</u>

These units again are organised into formations as follows :

Cavalry Brigades	..	..	..	..	4
Mounted Brigades	..	..	..	..	2
Territorial Force Mounted Brigades	..	..	..	..	14
Regular Divisions	..	..	..	..	6
Territorial Divisions	..	..	..	..	14

There are thus in organised form twenty divisions at present in the United Kingdom, the equivalent of ten Army Corps, without counting the Coast Defence and Line of Communication units, which amount to a large number.

Had the Expeditionary Force left these shores, the Territorials would have commenced their embodied war training before any part of that Force had begun to embark.



## 30 FUTURE OF TERRITORIAL FORCE

me doubtful. It has been my duty to visit many parts of the country during the last three years, and I have come into contact with much that we have not yet touched—an apparently very large number of willing citizens who, to-day outside the Territorial Army, would gladly join it if they could get the chance. It may well prove unnecessary to resort to these further sources. I think that, with the Force at a strength of five-sixths of the establishment after a couple of years of the new system, we may now concentrate our energies on improvements in the training and conditions as to which experience is already instructing us. As the Force improves its very reality will probably gradually bring in the remaining sixth that is still wanting. But there are regions which lie close at hand where we could apparently without delay wipe out the deficit by merely extending the organisation which the General Staff originally planned. The question is one of the reality of the spirit of voluntary service to the State, and of this reality the best judges are not soldiers but civilians. It is no matter of imposing conditions for their good on the great mass of the population. The real point is whether

among the thirty-nine million inhabitants of Great Britain there are to be found three hundred and fifteen thousand young men who have in them the spirit of patriotism.

The Churches constitute a voluntary organisation, and they maintain a far larger establishment with little effort, simply because the sense of religious duty is a real one. Not less real, and probably at least as general, is the sense of the obligation of social service, a sense which has grown with the growth of democracy. Are we then to despair of modern capacity for patriotic duty? If the natural leaders of opinion elect to sit down in doubt and tears over the incapacity of their fellow citizens for the higher aspects of life, doubtless the latter will begin to weaken in their confidence in their country and themselves. But if, instead, these leaders, animated by feeling even much short of the faith that moves mountains, set themselves steadily and unanimously to that work of encouragement and organisation which is already being done admirably by those who are working in the County Associations, then the result does not seem to me doubtful. I may be called an optimist, and I shall be

glad to be so called. For the belief that is in me is born of experience. I have travelled into most parts of the country, and I have addressed meetings in many centres, great and small. I have had as much opportunity as most men of studying the attitude of my fellow countrymen when the appeal has been made to them to do that which love of their country should enjoin. I have seen party politics put on one side, and I have witnessed a response from men and women in every class of society to the call of duty. And as the outcome I wholly decline to think so ill of them as do certain of the prophets. But suppose that we gave up the struggle, and that we could succeed in a yet more difficult task. Suppose that, contrary to the national instinct as it is to-day—an instinct which some scientifically minded soldiers and sailors think a sound one—we had succeeded in persuading the electors to agree to raise and pay for a Home Defence Army compulsorily recruited and trained for a couple of years after the fashion of Regulars. The Financial Notes printed as Appendix VII. (written for me some little time ago) show that an Army on these lines, to furnish the same numerical strength as the Territorials for Home De-



fence, and as the present Expeditionary Force for service abroad, would cost about a million and a half more than at present.\* Suppose we raised the Home Defence Army to a million men it would cost many millions more than at present. Suppose, further, that we had been able to do this without materially impairing the industrial capacity which makes our output per head of the population greater by much than that of our competitors. Suppose all this accomplished—what then? Should we be better off with this ring of a million bayonets bristling round the coast? They would be more, by a long way, than was necessary to force the adversary to come in such numbers as to constitute the requisite target for the Navy. But what if the Navy could not command the sea? Then we should sooner or later starve and have to submit, not the less certainly for having the million men with us. Command of the sea lies at the root of the whole matter. We have not a population that can raise a home army of the magnitude that is possible for some Continental Powers. But our wealth and

\* An Expeditionary Force raised by Compulsion could be used only for short campaigns, and could not be sent to India or elsewhere for long service over-sea.

### 34 NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE PLAN

our great naval tradition make it comparatively easy for us to keep well ahead of any possible adversary in naval strength, at all events for many years to come, and after that the development of the Naval and Military organisation of the Empire ought to have done the rest. We can therefore remain in superior power on the water, and we ought to do so; for nothing else can give us security, and under cover of this superiority we can easily build the relatively small military structure that is necessary for a second line for Home defence. I therefore dismiss, in entire agreement with Sir Ian Hamilton's view, the proposition that an army on the Continental model is necessary for purposes of Home defence.

Let us look at another proposal which has more support at this moment, that of the National Service League, of which the details will be found in the Appendix. What should we gain on balance by substituting for the Special Reserve 80,000 men less well trained, and for the Territorials 320,000 men compulsorily enlisted and trained for four months ? \*

\* This is the figure for Infantry ; for other arms, six months.

force be a better one? To begin with, would they do more than the amount of training to which the Act of Parliament compelled them? The Territorial, as a rule, does much more than his standard training. He is on the look-out for the chance of improving it at odd times; and experience shows that what he accomplishes depends on the chances of improving himself that he can get from his employer and from his commanding officer. There is a great difference between the man who has got no choice and the keen enthusiast who is there because he is an enthusiast. If the first or Regular Line must be recruited, as it is to-day, on a voluntary basis, then, for the reasons assigned by Sir Ian Hamilton, recruiting for it would be seriously jeopardised if a general system of training were made compulsory during the period of life at which recruits enlist for the Regular Army. The risk of depleted cadres is, in my opinion, too great for any Adjutant-General to face willingly, and Parliament ought not to put it upon him. He may have in a single year to collect fifty or sixty thousand men for the first line and Special Reserve—men willing to take the obligation of a long period of service. He gets



them to-day, and, under present conditions, without much difficulty. But would he get them under the altered circumstances? Sir Ian Hamilton's observations on past experience in our own and other countries should make those on whom lies the burden of proof pause before they assert that the change can be made without the risk of disaster.

Moreover, there is a difficulty hardly less formidable in the question of Officers. To train 150,000 recruits annually for at least four months would require an addition to the present establishment of officers estimated by the National Service League itself at nearly 5,000. For obvious reasons, these would have to be professional officers, though the League reckons only 2,000 of them as such. But where are these additional officers to come from? It is difficult enough to keep up the present establishment for the Regular Army; and to get even 2,000 more for an unattractive service is a task which passes at all events such wits as I possess. The figures given in the Remarks printed as Appendix IV show the extent of a difficulty which appears to have escaped the attention of those who drew up the programme of the National Service

League. That programme, which is also printed as Appendix III, can hardly have been the work of any one familiar with the difficult business of estimating the requirements and cost of an army. When one looks at the figures in the light of the remarks upon them written by the authority to whom Sir Ian Hamilton refers—a public servant whose name is associated by those engaged in military administration with a reputation for far-reaching knowledge and experience and for great accuracy—one finds that the estimate of cost has left out so much that is essential that it is wrong by at least four millions sterling. Whatever else is obscure, it is clear that the system sketched in the Bill and programme of the National Service League would cost, roughly, eight millions of pounds *per annum* more than do the Territorial Force and Special Reserve to-day. Now, if this somewhat substantial additional sum is to be found by the public, I should, for reasons already assigned, prefer to spend the money on increasing the Navy still further, and in adding to the establishment of the Regular Army a new Division to be kept always at home. But I do not think that any such sum ought to be spent, at least on the Army.

Of the size of the Navy I do not presume to judge; what is clear is that it is strong at present. But the scheme for the reorganisation of the Forces which was in 1907 adopted by Parliament seems to me, if carried out properly, to rest on the right principle so far as the Army is concerned. To make a huge addition to the Army Estimates for the purpose of carrying out the plan of the National Service League appears to many soldiers to be not only an extravagant and unnecessary proceeding, but to be strategically unsound. It was not by dwelling on the idea of passive defence that our forefathers made our country what it is to-day. It is our inherited tradition that the real foundation of our system of defence, at home and abroad, must always be the capacity of promptly assuming the offensive and of launching a counter attack at the points where the enemy is vulnerable. We cannot by training infantry recruits compulsorily for four months hope to raise a force that we can send abroad to fight battalions that have had two years' training. The projectors of the system I am discussing appear to have had no particularly clear idea of what it was they wanted to be at. I have read many of their



articles and speeches, and I hasten to say that there are some things in them which I fully understand and with which I agree. I am with them in thinking that physical training ought to be organised as an essential part of an educational system, and I attach much value to the habit of self-restraint and co-operation in a common endeavour which is the outcome of discipline. The principles of organisation so admirably illustrated by the Cadet and Boys' Brigade systems, and by Sir Robert Baden-Powell's Boy Scouts, appear to me to be altogether good and proper for adoption by the State. The point is, not whether these things are excellent, but whether there are not cheaper ways of acquiring them for the nation than one which imperils the first line of our Army. I venture to commend to public consideration the broad question whether it is possible anywhere to establish adequate military systems of compulsory and voluntary service side by side in the same country. I doubt it. At all events, the question requires much study, far more than it has received, before an affirmative answer is given. Neither the habits and record of our own people nor the analogies of foreign

experience appear to encourage such an answer.

The study of the question of National Defence which I have made during the four years in which I have applied my mind to it as closely as I could, has led me to a definite conclusion. I now submit it to the public. On the assumption, not to be lightly made, that we can get over all preliminary difficulties, industrial, social, and financial, it would be possible for us to substitute a larger force for the Expeditionary Army of six divisions and a Cavalry division, which we have now organised and keep at home ready for service over-sea. This force would be prepared after the Continental model and compulsorily recruited, with the minimum of two years' training that would be requisite. Such a force could be sent to the Continent for a comparatively short campaign, but it could not be sent to reinforce the British Army over-sea in India and elsewhere for a prolonged campaign. Yet the scheme of the National Service League would, to the best of my judgment, neither give us a Force of Continental quality nor leave us our Expeditionary Army at anything like its present strength. This scheme, therefore, whatever its merits

from an educational and peace point of view, appears, from that of preparation for war, to be open to grave objection. It exposes us to substantial risk of becoming weaker than we are at present as an armed nation, and it appears to contain neither the promise nor the potency of filling up the gaps which it threatens to make. Its tendency is in the direction of the merely defensive, and away from the tradition which we have hitherto believed to be the inheritance of our people from Chatham and from Nelson. It was not by waiting for the enemy to arrive on these shores, or by wasting their resources in preparations for it, that these great British strategists carried on the operations of war. They defended the Empire, and with it these islands, not by sitting down and making preparations for the enemy's coming, but by throwing their efforts into seeking him out, and into fashioning their instruments for offence.

The main reasons for the conclusion thus indicated are contained in this little book. Although a layman, I do not apologise for having taken a part in stating them. For the problem of our strategy is a problem which our history as a nation shows to have



been one not for soldiers alone. It is too large and too far-reaching to be so confined. Sir Ian Hamilton knows this well, and because he knows it well I commend his memorandum to the study of all interested in the question of National Defence.

R. B. HALDANE.

*October 1910.*

## COMPULSORY SERVICE

DEAR MR. HALDANE,

You have asked me to consider how far, if at all, compulsory service could be made applicable to our Imperial system, and I gather that your choice has fallen upon me because, during the year I have held the post of Adjutant-General to the Forces, I have been compelled to take daily cognisance of those recruiting and drafting problems which underlie the existence of our Empire. Also, because, having soldiered at various times with the armies of Prussia, Saxony, Austria, Russia, Japan, and the United States of America, I have (as you know from my reports) already made some attempts to analyse the conditions of those great Services.

To the best of my belief, there is no good military work advising as to the problems, social, political, and recruiting, Great Britain would have to face were she to endeavour

to shape her land forces on the Swiss, German, French, or any other European model. But there are facilities for grasping at least the outlines and general drift of conscription in the countries where it has prevalence. The book "Jena or Sedan," written as it is by an officer of high repute amongst his comrades, renders available to the world at large a convincing picture of the German military system with its advantages and drawbacks. Therein the reader may study the working of the greatest engine the world has yet seen for the manufacture of a particular type of human intellect and body. He may watch it turning out sealed-pattern citizens by the hundred thousand ; backs straightened, chests broadened, clean, obedient, punctual, but, on the other hand, weakened in their individual initiative.

Yes, conscription is a tremendous leveller. The proud are humbled ; the poor-spirited are strengthened ; the national idea is fostered ; the interplay of varying ideals is sacrificed. Good or bad, black or white, all are chucked indifferently into the mill, and emerge therefrom, no longer black or white, but a drab, uniform khaki.

The best way of getting at the British

people and of explaining to them the strong and weak points of voluntary service would be to write an English "Jena or Sedan" entitled, perhaps, "Delhi or Dorking." Therein the fortunes of a young recruit might be traced from the day he enlisted—hungry, hopeless, unable to get the most poorly paid job—until, as one of the new Veteran Reserve, he is reviewed by his King, his broad chest glittering with medals, a silken hat on his head, and a pleasant sense of voluntarily performed duty in his heart. Or, to take the seamiest side of the garment, he fails, as a proportion must fail everywhere. He has dropped back, on reverting to civil life, as low, or even lower, than his starting-point. This happens, though not very often. Yet even so; even at the worst, he retains one moral characteristic from his experiences in the Army worth a great deal to the State. English, Scottish, or Irish, once a soldier always a King's man; always, with rarest exceptions, a preservative, not a disintegrating, element in the population.

Unfortunately, I have neither the ability nor the leisure wherewith to deal effectively with an epic such as I have imagined, and I am driven therefore to the more common-



place expedient of laying down a few propositions whereby some light may be thrown upon the fundamental differences between the two great forms of National Service, as well as upon the deep, far-reaching consequences of cleaving to the one, or of embracing the other.

State policy is the art of carrying into effect the scheme of existence of a nation.

State policy must be active. Passivity—the motto “Live and let Live”—will no longer carry a nation through the strain and rivalry of this modern world. Hermit kingdoms have no place assigned to them in the latest phases of modern development.

When one State policy encounters the policy of a rival it must either efface itself, compromise, or stand firm. In the last two cases the State must be prepared for war.

War is the pursuit of State policy over the boundary of law and logic into the domain of force. In war we see the devouring of a moribund by an active policy, or the clash of two active policies, with their train of opposing ideas and interests.

Commerce is the leading idea and first interest of the modern State; and so soon as a Government is faced by the alternative

of seeing some millions of workers lose their livelihood through unemployment or of losing a few thousand lives in battle, it will quickly know how to decide.

Armies and navies are the instruments of this ultimate policy of force.

In a well-governed State the most careful proportion is maintained between policy and instruments. So long as a different, and therefore potentially rival, State policy exists upon the globe there is no duty so sacred. For, if the policy is allowed to become too ambitious or enterprising for the strength of the instruments, disaster becomes merely a matter of time. If, on the other hand, the instruments have been allowed to become so powerful that they shape the policy; if the Home, Foreign, Colonial, and Finance departments are directed primarily by strategical considerations, why then the rest of the world take fright and band together, in hostile array, like cattle confronted by a wolf.

Generally, the policy of a State may be gauged by its Army and Navy. Thus, were Great Britain to raise her Regular Army at home to a million bayonets, her claim to possess a supreme Navy would wear another significance.

To keep an army and navy up to the mark, not only money but also thought, and (if it is to be had) original thought, must be freely forthcoming. An army may be numerous and expensive and yet be unsatisfactory, owing to its having been organised to meet conditions which no longer exist.

Armies may be raised on a Regular or a Militia basis. Under a Regular system men are trained in barracks by professional officers and non-commissioned officers. Under a Militia system, all ranks are composed of citizens living in their own homes.

A regular army is a more effective instrument of war than a militia, and a militia is more effective than a mob. Because, for any work in the world, from writing poetry to peeling potatoes, professionals are better than amateurs and amateurs better than people totally unpractised.

A mob represents the absolute negation, or zero, of military efficiency. Multiply it by what you will—number of its individuals, number of days embodied—it still remains zero. A militia generally represents a low or mediocre military standard. But just as the distinction between a practised gentleman rider and a jockey may become ex-

tremely fine, so, if a militia is embodied long enough (especially under the strain and excitement of actual war) it may draw level with its regular comrades. Therefore, it is on the outbreak of war, particularly unexpected war, that Regulars show their greatest superiority over Militia.

So much of the life of the modern State marches with its armies or is embarked in its navy that the result of the first great encounter must be infinitely more decisive than in former times. Hence a growing inclination to steal a march on the enemy by dispensing with a declaration of war.

Compulsory service is inspired by the spirit of self-conservation, by the spirit of nationalism. Should statesmen endeavour to use such a machine for distant or dynastic purposes they betray an idea, and will ultimately have to pay the penalty.

Voluntary service is inspired by the spirit of self-expansion, by a spirit of self-confidence so genuine and so deep as to engender a belief that others will be benefited by being brought under the flag. The spirit of Imperialism, the adventurous spirit, the appreciation of the romance of war, the true spirit of the professional army, can only there find its free expression.



## 50 DRAWBACKS OF COMPULSORY SERVICE

In one way, compulsory service is certainly less civilised than voluntary service. In a conscription country the average healthy grown man remains a warrior until he becomes superannuated, as was also the case amongst the Vikings and Huns. From another standpoint, it is less aggressive, less of a danger to the world at large, seeing that, by its very nature, *it is a weapon that cannot be lightly used, and that its statesmen are constantly sacrificing their Imperial ambitions on the altar of home defence.* I beg of you earnestly to ponder over the words I have here italicised. The idea they attempt to convey lies at the root of the whole problem we are discussing. If the national mind once gets set upon the defensive, the Imperial idea must suffer—as, for example, in 1803–4–5, when the thought that prepossessed the people of England was the piling up of partially trained men by the hundred thousand.

Voluntary service coincides in one of its leading attributes with a great principle of modern life and progress, seeing that it depends upon specialisation. Two classes of the community undertake the fighting part of the national business; all the other classes devote themselves uninterruptedly

to their own private business, and pay for war, not with their persons but with their purses. For this very reason the bulk of the nation views war with a less tragic regard, and is encouraged to run considerable risks in home defence rather than abate by so much as one square mile of barren waste their Imperial pretensions. Thus the "valour of ignorance" may not be wholly disadvantageous.

British statesmen have been shy about pledging themselves definitely to either of these moral conceptions. When they do harden their hearts and come down clearly on one side of the fence, it is usually on the side opposite to that which a soldier would have expected. Thus we have the Imperialist advocating that compulsory service which, whatever its merits, is not likely to strengthen our hold over distant parts of the world; whilst we have the Anti-Imperialist holding up his hands in horror at that same system, which is, actually, a training-school for his tenets. Meanwhile the country is becoming uneasy and perplexed. Instinctively the dullest and most indifferent are aware that the military forces of a State should be raised and trained expressly to satisfy its needs,

only subject to the limitations imposed by social considerations and by the funds it has at its disposal. But what are those needs? Have they ever been clearly stated? If not, it is for you to make the statement, and it may perhaps assist you to grasp the essentials of the problem if its military aspect is here clearly set forth.

The true military policy of any State must be contained in one of the following three definitions, or within some combination of those same three definitions:

1. Imperial defence of distant frontiers such as those of Rome or Great Britain;

2. Home defence where imminent peril overshadows the very existence of the State, as is the case to-day in France and Germany;

3. Home defence where the danger appears to be less imminent, as is the case in Great Britain to-day, and as was the case in Rome during the reign of Augustus and his successors for a period of two or three hundred years.

Experience throughout the ages has shown that the military forces employed as in (1) must be raised on a voluntary basis. Rome

possessed a perfect Militia system, but the moment she began to expand imperially she was forced to abandon it in favour of the professional and voluntary system. The examples of Spain in Cuba and of Italy in Abyssinia show how futile, nay, how disastrous, must be the attempt to conduct Imperial defence on the basis of compulsory service. In Germany certain Generals did suggest that conscript troops should be sent for the relief of Peking. Not only were they overruled, but they suffered in reputation for having shown so little appreciation of what the country would or would not stand in the way of forced service.

Besides the troops actually employed on the frontiers of an Empire as in (1), there must also be a strong central reserve kept at home in readiness to reinforce those troops in case of need. Neither politically nor militarily would it be just or advantageous to create such a reserve on a compulsory basis. Kuropatkin has told us how poorly the reservists from European Russia fought when compared with the Siberian Reservists, who were defending their own frontier, and explains that the distance from their homes had become so great that the Europeans were no longer sustained by the national idea.



The British could not employ a conscript reserve with good results in such a contingency as another Indian Mutiny or even in a war in Afghanistan, or Persia, or Egypt. Who is to guarantee that the parents of the men would let them go, or that, if they did go, they would fight? No instance can be drawn from history of the successful employment for such purposes of men compelled to serve against their will. No; not even if they were only wanted temporarily, at a crisis.

Turning now to (2), the case of immediate danger to a State. Here readiness to take the field at short notice is even more essential than in (1). The Army must be a first-line Army. Experience proves it must be raised on a Regular basis, the men being exercised in barracks under professional officers and, to a large extent, professional non-commissioned officers. Modern practice puts the period of training at from two to three years. Such a force should be animated by the spirit of the citizen fighting for his own home. It may therefore legitimately be raised on the national basis—that is, the compulsory basis. In the foregoing paragraph I have shown that this type of army never has been, and cannot

now be, used for long-range purposes, for distant wars. But for offensive purposes at short range against a neighbouring country it may be most formidable. Let it be clearly understood, however, that *offence in this instance is, or ought to be, simply an incident of home defence*. When I say "ought to be" I mean that the Army must believe that the offensive is only being taken to anticipate a blow aimed at the homeland itself. Thus, were rulers and Governments always unambitious and honest, conscription might be actually, what it so often professes to be, a guarantee of peace. Unfortunately, history is one unbroken series of events tending to show that Governments can very easily impose upon their people. Some of my reports have shown you how strongly I am possessed by the belief that even professed continental Pacificists will fall quickly into line once the national spirit has been thoroughly inflamed. Here and there a pistol shot may break the smoothness of the mobilisation period. After that, silence! Like the Freemasons of the sixties, the Socialists and Pacificists of the twentieth century will do as they are told—though not quite so well, I humbly submit, as voluntarily enlisted

soldiers. How can the cogwheel jib when the engine begins to move ?

Still, the limitations of such a force are, from the military point of view, sufficiently serious, seeing that it can only be honestly employed in wars which are believed to be, in their essence, defensive, and that it becomes ineffective in proportion as the idea of conquest begins to dominate the idea of defence. Not the German soldier, but Bismarck, fought for Alsace-Lorraine. A conscript army then cannot be used at a distance at all, and can only be used aggressively against a neighbour when the bulk of the nation are convinced that, by taking the offensive, they are anticipating some plot or preparation against themselves or interposing on behalf of the downtrodden of their own nationality. The employment by Japan of her national army in Manchuria represents the extreme point to which long-range action by such a force can be carried. Up to the battle of Mukden the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men felt they were fighting for the defence of Japan. After Mukden, this idea lost force, and correspondingly the energy of the army began to fade away. The reaction was not very

pronounced, owing to the intensity of the initial patriotic impulse and the natural secretive tendency of the Japanese character. But it was unmistakable to the initiated, and the Elder Statesmen were far too wise to listen to the hotheads who spoke of marching on Harbin.

The fact of the matter is that a voluntarily enlisted army possesses greater staying power than the force of a nation in arms. The aching nausea of home-sickness; the exasperation to the strained nerves of the ceaseless danger and intermittent crackling of musketry, the sheer physical revolt from dirt and rags and starvation; the enervating dreams of decent food and of the girls they left behind them; all these influence conscript campaigners in double or treble degree. For three solid years did our British Regulars in South Africa see local corps dissolved and reconstituted; see Yeomanry and Volunteers and over-seas Colonial Corps sail away to great receptions in their homes; see them relieved in due course by fresh substitutes drawing more than four times the regular pay for identical work less efficiently performed. Still, these British Regulars stuck to it; always ready for a fight if only their Commander would let



them go ; grumbling not more than usual ; and then, at the end of it all, remaining to garrison the desolated, war-stricken wastes they had created—but had won ! Search the world over, you will find no conscript soldier, European or Asiatic, who could have done what our voluntarily enlisted Regulars did in South Africa, only ten short years ago.

The present generation regard the German campaign of 1870 with an admiration which is absolutely justified. But if they had the privilege of personal friendship with some of the survivors of that historic epoch, they might learn from them, though not from military histories, to what alarming heights rose the wave of war-weariness in the souls of the invading armies during January and February of 1871. Yet France was a pleasant, fruitful land compared with South Africa ; the war was supposed to be essentially a war of defence ; an uninterrupted series of victories had shed their glamour over the battlefields.

You remember how in March last year I took my leave, so as to see as much as an ordinary traveller could legitimately see of the mobilisation in Budapest and Belgrade. Naturally I have often seen a corps

raised by voluntary enlistment get the order to make ready for war. Could you only share my experiences in these respects they would explain better than volumes of writing how it is that volunteers resist war-weariness better than conscripts.

So far I have discussed (1), where the home provinces are secure and the question is that of the defence of distant frontiers; and (2), where there is no great outside Empire, and where the question is one of the defence of the home provinces. Now I have to consider (3), where the Empire has been built up under conditions of home security, and where a certain anxiety begins to be felt by statesmen regarding a possible attack upon headquarters. History has proved that only when a country is in the main free from fear of its neighbours can it spread its wings far abroad. The gradual shrinkage of the Roman Empire as the home menace increased is evidence enough of the converse process. The most perfect of all imaginary securities occurs when the State is an island and possesses command of the sea. As Bacon says, "He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of war as he will." Therefore, clearly, when an island has achieved

world empire, and is then challenged in its naval supremacy, and threatened at its heart, a situation of great complexity and difficulty is certain to arise.

It may be assumed that the strain of maintaining a long-service professional army is already fairly heavy, and under such conditions it will be doubly difficult to persuade the citizen of the State to assume the enormous additional burden that an immediate state of readiness—on a compulsory basis—will entail. Such a burden is not only personal but financial. Accordingly we expect to find, as we do find, a tendency, an inclination, to compromise. The long-range voluntary army must stand for the defence of the Imperial frontiers; but it is in a sense counted twice over. It is felt that the professional soldiers may, or a part of them may, be counted upon to lend a hand to the home provinces in time of need. Therefore, it is argued, it is not necessary to go so far as countries which are not only exposed to greater dangers on their frontiers but possess no voluntarily enlisted regular army. To sum up, then, in this third case, where the frontiers of the Empire are being held by a long-service voluntary army, and where the

danger to the home provinces has not yet become very immediate or universally apparent, it will always be difficult to persuade people to pay very heavily, either in purse, or in person as well as purse, for a special home-defence army raised and trained on a Regular basis.<sup>1</sup>

For the average practical statesman, the conclusion reached in the foregoing paragraph should, as far as it goes, suffice. So long as their Navy remains supreme, the people of Great Britain and Ireland will regard with aversion and suspicion any proposal for a large increase in their present type of regular army or for the adoption of universal compulsory service of the continental type, with its two or three years spent in barracks, commencing not earlier than the age of twenty. But I am addressing you on the assumption that you are in search of higher truths than those comprised

<sup>1</sup> I repeat, in case of misunderstanding, that, under a Regular system, men are trained in barracks by professional officers and non-commissioned officers. Under a Militia system, all ranks are composed of citizens, living in their own homes. Armies are divided materially into two categories, Regular or Militia; morally also into two categories, Voluntary or Conscript. These divisions are perfectly clear, and cannot be confounded by the invention of question-begging epithets.



in the gospel of political expediency. Not easily will I forget the evening when, in the interests of the discipline of the Army, you doubled the powers of Commanding Officers in a house containing a great Liberal majority. I assume then, confidently, that you would not exclude from your consideration an unpopular idea merely because of its unpopularity. Therefore I will discuss these alternatives more fully.

From an ex-Adjutant-General's point of view, from the expert's point of view, any large increase of our present type of regular army is impracticable, without an expenditure disproportionate to the results.

There is no great margin of raw material available over the, say, 60,000 first-line and Special Reserve recruits we suck from the unskilled labour market (to its huge relief) in an average year. It is not a matter of any moderate advance in rates of pay. We might, without too much effort, increase our establishment by 10,000 or 15,000, or perhaps by 20,000 men; but then we should be at the end of our tether, unless the recruiter was enabled to compete on even terms with employers in the skilled labour market. Therefore I definitely discard the idea of enlarging our existing type of

regular army in normal times of peace by more than one Division of all arms.

The question of the practicability, as apart from the popularity, of adopting the pure continental type of conscription is not quite so easy to determine. But I have accumulated experiences abroad during the past few years which may shed some light on the problem.

After compliments, the first remark made by a foreign officer to a British officer is now, almost invariably, "Is it the case you are going to adopt conscription?"

To such an inquiry I invariably, if I have time, avoid making a direct response, but give my interlocutor instead a brief sketch of the British Over-seas Army, with its annual requirement in recruits and drafts. Having done so, I ask, in the case of a German, "Now, supposing you wished to maintain 113,000 European soldiers in South-West Africa, by voluntary enlistment, would you be able, by the offer of good pay, to get men to come forward?" Whether my friend happens to be a Corps Commander or a Subaltern, a Colonel or a Warrant Officer, the answer is more or less decisively in the negative. All are equally eager to explain that German conscripts are proud

to serve their two years, and that, for the rest of their lives, they look back upon their period of military service with pleasure. None the less they have had quite enough of it, even before they have finished their recruits' drill, to make it most difficult to bribe them to accept a longer period of voluntary service abroad. Far from being able to keep 113,000 men abroad on such a basis, Germany could not afford, unless she were to cut down other Imperial services, to increase her foreign-service army much beyond its present microscopic dimensions.<sup>1</sup> The following facts are put forward in support of my conclusion:

The rank and file of the German forces in South-West Africa are recruited partly from volunteers from the Navy and Army, and partly from men who elect to do their term of military service in the Protectorate.

The period of service is three and a half years, and may be extended.

Four months' leave to Europe on full

<sup>1</sup> The strength of this army is:

German S.-W. Africa	..	..	..	2,190
German East Africa	..	..	..	326
Cameroons	..	..	..	170
Togoland	..	..	..	0

Kiauchao is entirely under the Naval authorities.

pay, and with free passage to and fro, are given during the first term of service. If the term is extended, leave is again due after a period of three years.

The annual pay of non-commissioned officers and rank and file (Infantry) is:—

		<i>S.-W. Africa.</i>		<i>Home.</i>
Sergeant ..	..	£70 to £75	..	£23 15 0
Under Officer ..	..	£60	..	£15 2 6
Lance Corporal ..	..	£55	..	£4 17 0
Private ..	..	£50	..	£3 19 0

In addition, a free ration and clothing are given.

The annual pay (including proficiency pay) of British non-commissioned officers, and rank and file (Infantry) is identical in South Africa, in India, and at home:

Sergeant ..	..	..	..	£51 14 2
Corporal ..	..	..	..	£38 0 5
Lance Corporal ..	..	..	..	£30 8 4
Private ..	..	..	..	£25 17 1

The cost of passages is a very important item in the cost of an over-sea garrison. In this respect no exact comparison can be made with the British short-service man, who, however, usually serves about five years abroad without furlough, and is then brought home for transfer to the Reserve. But, comparing the German soldier



with the British re-engaged soldier, the former is in this respect nearly twice as expensive, seeing that he is allowed leave every third year, whereas our men have to serve six full years abroad before they are brought home at Government expense. Even then, the British soldier can only get the indulgence provided he has two full years yet to serve with the colours and is desirous of remaining abroad. Again, under such rules, one-ninth of the German garrison will always be absent on leave, thereby adding one-eighth to the total cost of a garrison of given effective strength.

Taking these factors, then, into consideration it seems that the cost to the Fatherland of pay and passages for a private serving in South-West Africa is about twice as much as we expend upon his red-coated cousin serving practically alongside of him.

Obviously India would ruin the Germans in a very few years if they had to keep it garrisoned by Europeans on such terms. Equally obviously, if Germany did get British South Africa and India, she would have to recast in some way that whole system of military training which some Britons are now anxious to copy.

In case of long-range expeditions, the advantage possessed by Great Britain is fully maintained. An examination has been carried out of the comparative cost per sabre, gun, and rifle of the expeditions of the Powers to Peking. Excluding the two Powers on the spot, Russia and Japan, the most costly was that of Germany, the next Austria, the third France. Cheapest of all, by a considerable margin, came Great Britain. A similar investigation has been made into the comparative cost per sabre, gun, and rifle, of the South African War, the Somaliland Expedition, and the Sudan Campaign, as against the German South-West African Campaign. As a result, the South African War and the Somaliland Expedition were found to be 40 per cent cheaper than the South-West African Campaign, whilst, although the Sudan Campaign was considerably more expensive than the other two mentioned, it was still proportionately more economical than the campaign conducted by the Germans.

In Russia, the impossibility of combining voluntary service with the present system is still more emphatically asserted. The whole of her military forces are recruited under the universal-service system, and

they could not, I will prove, be maintained in any other way. Officers of all ranks agree that national feeling, as well as prohibitive cost, render anything like a Russian edition of our existing Over-seas Army inconceivable. The people have a stronger traditional distaste for mercenary military service than our people have for unpaid military service. So intensely is this prejudice engrained in their characters that it has been found difficult to persuade non-commissioned officers, even by very handsome extra allowances, to prolong their service with the Colours, and thus subject themselves to the reproach of being professional soldiers.

A Russian company of infantry has seven non-commissioned officers of whom, by regulation, three should be re-engaged men; but this proportion has never been attained, and the deficiency has reached as much as 50 per cent.<sup>1</sup> At the commencement of 1904 only about one-seventh of the non-commissioned officers were re-engaged, and the remainder were ordinary serving soldiers, some of whom, to the astonishment of the Japanese, were found to be practically

<sup>1</sup> Another high authority from Russia put it at 65 per cent, but I give the most moderate estimate in the text.

uneducated. This lack of good non-commissioned officers is what, as much probably as any other single factor, lost them the war. At the close of 1905, therefore, new regulations were issued, trebling the pay of re-engaged non-commissioned officers. It was laid down that upon the expiration of two years' re-engaged service, suitable men should be promoted to the rank of sub-ensign. Upon the completion of ten years' such service, sub-ensigns might go to the Reserve or National Militia with a bounty of £106. Upon the completion of thirteen years' re-engaged service all sub-ensigns should be discharged or transferred to the Militia, with a life pension of £10 a year. These sums may not sound very magnificent in the ears of a rich Englishman, but, actually, they are liberal.

None the less, the amounts offered proved inadequate to overcome the Russian dislike of voluntary military service, and the new regulations failed to attract the number of men required. Arrangements were therefore made with other Ministries in 1909 for the reservation of Government posts of an average salary of £30 to £40 per annum for all sub-ensigns discharged after ten or fifteen years' extended service. It was further



decided that they should be allowed a four months' furlough on full pay in the first, fourth, seventh, tenth, and thirteenth years of their re-engaged service. I am writing now in St. Petersburg, and I may say that these new regulations are expected to prove successful. At all events, they have had some initial success, for the number of re-engagements in the first three months of 1910 exceeded by 4,000 those in the corresponding months of the previous year. The total number of re-engaged non-commissioned officers is now 25,000. It is intended to increase it to 73,000.

There is special difficulty in inducing men to re-engage in the Pri-Amur Military District. To remedy this, re-engaged men who are serving in Siberia are to be given four months' leave every three years, and their journey to and from Europe will be paid.

Thus we find that Russia has had to go even further than Germany to get a voluntary force of at present only 25,000 non-commissioned officers. These are men in authority, whose life is made comparatively agreeable in many ways. Clearly, Russia could get no rank and file at all on a voluntary basis.

Here, then, we have the national idea

underlying conscription at its highest power. A Russian regimental officer has told me how, when his battalion reservists arrived in Manchuria, the first question they asked was, "Where are the churches?" When the Company Officers were forced to reply that there were no churches, the men rejoined, "We must go home. What business have we to be fighting for such a God-forsaken land? Evidently it does not belong, and never could have belonged, to the Tzar." Russia spreads, like the nettle, by thrusting out roots under the surface of the ground—not like the thistle, emblem of Scotland, launching seed into the air on a distant voyage. It is hard to conceive how modern Russia could hold the plains of India or the torrid zone of Africa.

The nearest approach to anything of the sort in climatic and other conditions is the Turkestan Military District, with a peace strength of 60,000 men. The settled Russian population in Central Asia amounted in 1901 to only 1·2 per cent of the total population. Therefore, for some time to come the reserves on mobilisation will have to be drawn almost entirely from European Russia. Still, Turkestan is not detached from the national soil of Russia, and Russians can

and do make their homes there. The same remarks apply to the Far East, only that there the climate is more suited to the Russian, and settlement proceeds more rapidly.

Service even in Central Asia or in Prior Trans-Amur is very much disliked. An attempt to add to the strain of national feeling by adding Afghanistan and India on to the Russian Empire would break down the conscription system, which could only, as has been shown, be replaced by the voluntary system at enormous expense. For the voluntary idea is dead and would have to be nursed at first like a hothouse plant in a costly conservatory.

Owing to the cohesive force of the national defence idea, it becomes even difficult for Russia to maintain an efficient navy outside of the Black Sea and the Baltic. Where her people cannot settle, cultivate, and beget children, the limitations of Russia's conscription system have been overstepped, and success becomes improbable.

France, again, has her own difficulties, although they are not the difficulties of Russia or Germany. Only one generation has passed since France maintained her armies on a system so honeycombed with

exemptions and re-engagements as practically to amount to a very undesirable type, but still a type, of voluntary service. France has also the magnificent memories of Napoleon to sustain her. Therefore we need not be surprised to find that the Imperial soldier-feeling is still alive in France, and that she is able, whilst maintaining conscription for home defence, to raise a foreign service army (*i.e.* Frenchmen in the Foreign Legion, and the Colonial Army) of some 56,000 men, of whom 28,000 serve in France. If it can be shown that French conditions closely resemble British conditions, then the problem is in a fair way to solution. That is to say, our present foreign service could, according to the French analogy, co-exist with compulsory home service, although it has already been proved that on the German or Russian analogy such a thing would be impossible.

The Foreign Legion and the Colonial Army of France are recruited, with very few exceptions, by voluntary enlistments or by voluntary transfer from the Home Army. Enlistments are for three, four, or five years; but as men are not sent to the Colonies until twenty-one years of age, they must engage to serve for such a period as will admit of their passing at least two



years in the Colonies. Re-engagements for periods not exceeding five years, and extensions of service up to twenty-five years' service, are allowed.

The inducements offered to recruits are briefly :

(a) Bounties on enlistment and re-engagements ;

(b) A daily rate of pay and colonial allowances ;

(c) Help in obtaining employment on return to civil life.

The bounties vary, and the general progress of recruiting can be estimated by the rates offered by the Government for enlistments and re-engagements. But the following figures give the rates in force since 1908 :

		ENGAGEMENTS FOR		
		3 years.	4 years.	5 years.
Sous-Officier. (N.C.O.				
above the rank of				
Corporal.) .. ..	£12	£24	£36	
Corporal or Private ..	£6 10 0	£13	£19 10 0	

For re-engagements, *sous-officiers* receive £12, and other ranks £6 10s. for every year's service up to ten.

A private who, by successive re-engagements, completed ten years' service would

have received £52 in bounties. No bounties are given after ten years' service.

The Colonial rates of pay vary with length of service from 10*d.* to 1*s.* 2*d.* a day for a private. In addition, a private would receive a Colonial allowance (which varies according to the locality) from  $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* to 5*d.* a day. A Colonial soldier serving in France gets about half the daily rate of pay. The pay of a private in the Home Army, being  $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* a day, comes to 15*s.* 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* per annum. But when the Colonial serves abroad his pay comes to about £25 per annum or, as nearly as possible, the equivalent of the British rate in actual cash received.

The actual cash, however, by no means, as in the case of the British soldier, exhausts the pecuniary inducements offered. "Help in obtaining employment on return to civil life" stands for a great deal more than the far-away chance of a pretty hard job as a postman, which is as much as Thomas Atkins can expect to get from the State. For the French Government has provided for its professional, as distinguished from its conscript soldiers, 65,000 nice little posts during the past twelve years. These are positions as minor functionaries in the offices of the State Departments, positions

secured in private business by official pressure, positions in the posts and telegraphs, positions on the railways, positions as foresters. What is the cash value of such inducements? That depends very much upon the man. To the superior handy-man who can always make his living in the open market, they are worthless. To the mediocrity, on the other hand, they are a godsend. But in the Army, as everywhere else, mediocre men largely predominate.

It is very difficult, then, fairly to appraise the value of these inducements. Arithmetic is a noble science, but it cannot build a bridge between matters of fact and matters of opinion. Thus, an admirer of voluntary service may point to the withdrawal of the conscript citizen for several years from productive labour. The conscriptionist retorts that the man will live longer, will measure two inches more round the chest. Who can split the economic difference? Therefore here we find ourselves in the region of guesswork. My guess is, then, that the certainty, with decent behaviour, of one of these Government posts is worth to the soldier during his serving time at least the sum of fourpence a day. But what is the cost to Government of providing him

with the post? If he earns his wages—nothing. I believe he does earn his wages—handsomely. I believe that the French Government get this sort of service better performed for them by old soldiers than they could possibly get it performed by flinging the appointments into the competition of the open labour market. But what then? The French professional soldier, when time-expired, receives a gift that costs the State nothing. Yet that gift means something considerable to him, and by just so much does the French soldier of the Colonial Army become a more highly paid article than his British equivalent.

So far as we have gone, there is nothing to show that the French nation has not successfully solved our problem. But there are one or two further points for consideration. First, have we any indications to show us the direction in which the French system is moving? Secondly, are there any other special inducements making for the success of the French system which would be wanting in Great Britain? Thirdly, is the French system worked upon a scale sufficiently important to serve as a safe guide to Great Britain?

The answer to the first question is dis-



couraging. True, the French military authorities have had no difficulty so far in recruiting for their Colonial Army. But some keen observers have noticed a change of sentiment, not only on the part of the civil population but also in the Army itself, which seems to indicate a movement towards the Russian mental attitude as regards voluntary service. I have travelled with a shipload of French Colonial soldiers from Marseilles to Saigon. They were physically of an excellent type, and they seemed to me soldiers of whom any nation might be proud. The rank and file are bigger, more mature, better set up, and more military-looking than the conscripts, by whose side they are sometimes seen working at manœuvres. Yet invariably French officers and men of other units speak of them with a certain condescension. Should a Colonial Brigade make a mistake, "What else can you expect?" is the usual sort of remark. Let them be late for a concentration, perhaps owing to no fault of their own, and the attentive ear may hear the great man mutter: "*Ces sacrés Coloniales, ils seront en retard au rendez-vous du bon Dieu!*" This phrase fairly expresses the tone of the rest of the Army towards its

voluntary-service comrades. The officers rarely attain higher command. Whether this is caused (as Frenchmen will tell you) by lack of ambition, or whether (as an Englishman might otherwise have suspected) lack of ambition is caused by certainty of non-success, is a point too delicate for a foreigner to determine. Is it too much, then, to assume that the French voluntary system is moving towards unpopularity? If so, does not such a fact seem to show that two such diametrically opposite principles as voluntarism and compulsion combine in one country with difficulty, and that there is a constant tendency for the weaker to go to the wall?

Secondly, as to special inducements favouring the French system. Here we strike up at once against the fact that the French soldier elects for the Colonial Army, with the negative inducement of thereby escaping home conscription with pay at the rate of  $\frac{1}{2}d.$  a day. No one has yet suggested that either British conscripts or national defenders should be paid at such a price. The National Service League, in their estimate dated February 1, 1909, propose to pay their recruits only sixpence a day less than our present regular recruits, and

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their trained men the same as the regular. All the advocates of some form of compulsory service appear to believe that the Labour Members and the organisations of working men they represent would no more be likely to agree to a conscript being paid  $\frac{1}{2}d.$  a day than they would be likely to approve of the reservation of Government posts for retired foreign-service volunteers. The stern clangour of the trumpet of duty summons the British patriot to be paid through the nose! How strangely must such a call to arms sound in the ear of the  $\frac{1}{2}d.$  a day French soldier serving on the opposite side of the Channel! I am by no means sure that the National Service League are not here doing their fellow-countrymen some injustice. Still, so far as it goes, their opinion must be taken, and it seems to strengthen the contention that the British conscript of the future would be much less likely to volunteer for foreign service than the existing Territorial.

Thirdly, as to the scale on which the French system is being worked. It has been already stated that the French Colonial Army numbers only 56,000 men, of whom 28,000 men are serving at home. According to the last returns, our Regular British troops

numbered 244,000 men, of whom 127,000 men were serving at home. Instead of finding 65,000 posts in twelve years for her foreign-service troops, as at present, France, were she to take over our Empire as a running concern, must find something well over a quarter of a million posts.

But it may be argued, and is argued, that if Great Britain and Ireland introduced conscription, the portion of the existing Regular Army which happened to be serving at home would be swept away forthwith. Therefore it is not correct, so it has been urged, to count the 127,000 Regular soldiers serving at home. Then why, may I ask, does France, in addition to her enormous conscript army, maintain 28,000 foreign-service soldiers at home out of a total of 56,000—nearly the same proportion, be it noted, as our own 127,000 Regular soldiers serving at home out of a grand total of 244,000? The answer is clear. France requires them. Whether for coast defence, for reinforcing coaling stations or for supplying drafts to her troops abroad, she requires them. If the whole of Great Britain and Ireland were one vast armed conscription camp we would still have to keep up, not only on the frontiers of the Empire, but here,



at home, large numbers of soldiers of the present type. True, if we made up our minds to sacrifice the linked battalions at home, and adopt depots in their place, we might reduce the number of Regulars at home by about half—but then we should have cut off our right arm, the Expeditionary Force. If, going a step further, we reduced the size of the depots by adopting a true twenty-one-years pensionable long-service force to garrison our foreign possessions, we should destroy our reserves, further weaken our striking power, and in the end save little or no money! For in course of time the pension bill for a long-service army carries off the best part of economies at first effected by cutting down the number of enlistments. The long-service corps would be inferior to the present type of corps for purposes of war, and there would be no reserves to send out to them in case of any Asian or African campaign. Therefore, even the Special Reserve could be abolished only were it determined that another Indian Mutiny or South African War must be carried on, practically from the beginning, by calling for volunteers from the Home Army to replace casualties (a method repugnant to any well-regulated military

mind), or by drafting out conscripts and units composed of conscripts whether they were prepared to fight or not.

As far as it goes, then, the Continental analogy is disappointing to those who believe that a Voluntary Regular Army such as ours might be grafted on to a system of conscription as it is understood and enforced in Europe and in Japan. It is certain, indeed, that neither Germany nor Russia could graft the present British voluntary system on to their own compulsory system, and it is most doubtful whether France could afford to do so, or whether, at any cost, she could find the necessary number of voluntary recruits. But it may be urged, and with justice, that our people are so different, so much more adventurous than Germans, Russians, or French, that no analogy based on those nations is convincing. May it not also be urged, however, that it is our reliance on the voluntary system which has kept up our adventurous spirit? However this may be, it is certain that no sooner do we endeavour to restrict the inquiry entirely to the British Isles than we are met by the difficulty that there is so little here to guide us as to the effect of military service on the natural bents of the recruiting market.

Only one narrow beam from the searchlight of experience illumines the dense mist of conjecture wherein we find ourselves groping. All the more necessary is it, then, that we should make the best use we can of it.

The scheme approved by the old War Office for enlisting men for three years' Colour service applied to all the principal Arms: Cavalry and Infantry of the Line, Artillery, Engineers, Army Service Corps, and Army Medical Corps. It came into force from April 1, 1902, and was discontinued from October 20, 1904.

The inducement offered to persuade three-years men to extend their service was that, by extending to eight years with the Colours, they became entitled to "Service Pay." They might extend at any time, but before they could draw service pay they must have completed two years' service—a condition which applied to all soldiers, whatever their terms of enlistment. All extended men with two years' service received Service Pay, Class II., at fourpence a day. This was all they could make absolutely sure of, but, practically, they knew that Class I. rate—sixpence a day—was attainable by all who cared to satisfy a very moderate prescribed standard of efficiency.

It was calculated that to make the scheme a success, that is, to ensure the required numbers being forthcoming for drafts for foreign service, the following percentages of men completing three years must extend their service to eight years :

Cavalry of the Line	..	..	..	41·90	per cent
Horse and Field Artillery	..	..	..	31·23	„
Mountain and Garrison Artillery	..	..	..	All	
Engineers	..	..	..	20·20	„
Infantry of the Line	..	..	..	71·68	„

In the actual event, of the Infantry enlisted in 1902 about 31·60 per cent eventually extended; of the 1903 batch, 36·53; of the 1904 batch, 40·42.

The refusal of young Infantrymen to extend came as a great shock to some of our military authorities. Soldiers by their own choice, their disinclination to continue in the Service astonished those who had believed that a closer acquaintance with peace service must render young men desirous of devoting their lives to it. Certainly the originator of the scheme had bad luck. If the unhappy experience of that experiment were not behind us it would probably not seem too unreasonable to any of us to imagine that a very large proportion of our well-cared-for, voluntarily enlisted, apparently



happy young soldiers would take on for sixpence a day extra. Once again the incalculable idiosyncrasies of the youthful Briton baffled the theorists. But we are no theorists now. We have an example to guide us how not to do it.

The breakdown of the scheme resulted in our having to send men all the expensive journey to India merely that they might remain there for one year. It led to bounties. In March 1906 bounties were offered to three-years men serving in India at the following rates :

£10	to extend to	6 years ;
£12	„	7 years ;
£15	„	8 years.

It was hoped that by these sums, in addition to the extra sixpence a day, 3,772 Infantry soldiers might be induced to extend, but only 1,586 did actually take on. The bounties paid amounted to rather over £23,400, and yet, despite the extravagant sending of soldiers for one or two years to India, and despite these bounties, we fell short in our duty of keeping up the Indian establishments. There was a corresponding shortage in all Colonial battalions.

Taking the returns for May 1—a date on

which the "trooping" for the year has been completed—the figures stood as follows :

*May 1, 1906*

Infantry in India was 44 over establishment ;  
All Arms in India were 746   ,,           ,,

*May 1, 1907*

Infantry in India, 771 under establishment ;  
All Arms in India, 558   ,,           ,,

*May 1, 1908*

Infantry in India, 1,585 under establishment ;  
All Arms in India, 1,674   ,,           ,,

*May 1, 1909*

Infantry in India, 48 over establishment.  
All Arms in India, 445   ,,           ,,

It will be seen that whilst we were sending three-years men to India, the strength did not fall below establishment, but that when the three-years men were no longer here to be sent out, and declined to extend in sufficient numbers, we could not complete the Indian drafts until the nine-years men and then the present seven-years terms of enlistment had been some time in operation. Indeed, we have not got over the experiment yet. To-day, in August 1910, we are still suffering from its indirect disorganising effects.

It has been shown how the national service idea wars against and weakens

the voluntary foreign-service idea in continental lands, wherever an attempt has been made, even on the smallest scale, to bring both systems simultaneously into play. But apart from these examples from abroad—not always very convincing to the Briton—there are certain obvious lessons to be drawn from the region of common sense, showing that, under the shadow of a continental conscription system, the distaste exhibited by the short-service soldiers of 1902-4 to prolonging their military career would tend to become greatly accentuated.

1. Their pay as conscripts would be less ;

2. Their work as conscripts would be harder ;

3. They would be conscripts.

Against an adverse deduction from (1) and (2), there may be some room for argument. The low pay of conscripts might not of itself give a distaste to military service, and it might indeed show up in pleasing relief the larger sums the foreign-service recruiter would offer. The harder work necessitated by the shorter period of service would not necessarily choke off good men. But (3) ? Which of us, knowing his own

countrymen, will not allow that the free-born Briton tends to become incurably prejudiced against any form of work or even amusement he may be forced into? Let the British workman undertake a duty of his own free will, and no one will be at greater pains to execute it thoroughly. To the authoritative command, "Fall in!" his inclination (not always repressed) is to retort, "Fall in yourself, and be d—d to you!" Suppose that for two or three years, say from the age of 18 to 21, the youth of the nation were compelled, under pain of fine or imprisonment, to attend three church services daily; would the nation become more religious? Would such a law tend to swell the attendance at extra voluntary services? I think there are many who would answer such questions in the affirmative. But I myself deny, and ever will deny, that to force food down a Briton's throat with a stomach-pump will give him an appetite for his dinner. I regard it as certain, then—as certain, that is to say, as anything concerning the impulses of young Britons can be—that if we had universal continental conscription we should not be able to get the necessary number of volunteers from the ranks of the



Home Army to keep our Foreign-Service Army alive.

Before proceeding to discuss other forms of service—and it must be remembered that until now the adoption of continental conscription has not been seriously set before the country—the alternative should be noted whereby recruits for the Voluntary Army should still be enlisted for that Army at a nominal 18, whereas, as abroad, the compulsory service would not commence until the age of 20. Such a system would be very wasteful. Instead of getting trained conscripts of 21 to volunteer to take ship for foreign ports at once, we should have to keep and train our foreign-service recruits for two or three years in England, very much as they are kept and trained at present both in England and in France, and we should have to do this although, possessing, as we should, an ample Home-Defence Army, we should not really require them. We might get the men. But personally I should not like to be responsible that they would be forthcoming in sufficient numbers, at present rates. With the labour market cleared of men between the ages of 20 and 23, it seems to me that the services of the hobbledehoy, now so much at a discount, might

appeal more attractively to the civil employer. If so, we should certainly fail in our competition with him unless we doubled our present rate of pay.

Summarising the conclusions reached thus far, it appears that, under a system of continental conscription, it would not be safe to trust to the maintenance of our Foreign-Service Army by volunteers from the Home-Defence Army. We could not, therefore, as has been suggested, balance the cost of a Home-Defence Army on the German model by sweeping away existing Home-Service linked battalions of Regulars unless we replaced these by depots, which would be, as I have tried to show, a very unsatisfactory method.

I do not propose to carry my examination of the probable effects of universal military service on the continental model any further. The only thing certain about its cost is that it must largely increase—perhaps double—our Army Estimates. Public feeling is not ripe for it. No one has proposed its adoption. But by taking that extreme case I have, I trust, been able to clear the outline of the general subject before approaching proposals more modest and, in so far, less impracticable.

When I say proposals, I go perhaps too far. For the difficulty of the whole of this question lies largely in the vagueness of the case for compulsion and in the absence of detailed proposals from any responsible person or association. It is the details that determine how a scheme will work and what it will cost. Here, however, are two schemes, detailed up to a certain point, one of which has been unofficially discussed by me with friends; the other, the only scheme as yet before the public.

(1) A Home-Defence Army, to be raised on continental conscription lines. The existing Special Reserve and Territorial Force to be abolished. The present voluntary, foreign-service Army to be reduced to a bare minimum by forming depots to replace linked battalions, and by turning the Indian and Colonial garrisons into twenty-one-years-service pensionable forces. India, South Africa, and the Colonies to pay the full cost of their British garrisons and also of the depots in this country necessary to maintain them, whereas at present South Africa, for instance, contributes not a halfpenny to the cost of the troops we maintain there.

(2) Compulsory Service on a Militia basis, as proposed by the National Service League.

Let us first examine (1).

As a basis of comparison, I will take the Home-Defence Army at such a strength that it would give us on mobilisation a force equivalent in numbers to the present Territorial Force. The establishment of the Territorial Force (excluding the newly authorised first-line reserve, technical and veteran reserves, which have not yet taken shape) is 315,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and men. To produce an equivalent force on mobilisation by German methods, a peace establishment of 123,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and men would be required. Your financial advisers have worked out the total annual cost of an imaginary British conscript soldier, maintained on the German scale, for housing, clothing, food, and pay, at £78 per head (including everything), instead of £103 as at present. Whether the British conscript would stand this, need not be argued here. I will only remark in passing that the pay is  $2\frac{3}{4}d.$  per diem. That the food (one square meal in the twenty-four hours ; breakfast and supper being supplied out of messing funds) is good, but is admitted not to be sufficient by itself. Men whose homes are in the garrison town receive help from



their parents. My soldier servants on German manœuvres have always received postal orders from their relatives during the period of absence from barracks. Others whose relatives are dead or absent get help from their comrades, or make cupboard love to cooks, like comedy policemen. As to clothing, the men are provided with one good outfit (not necessarily new), which is kept in store for them. For every-day work they have to wear old clothes, which are passed on from generation to generation for so long as they decently hang together, so as to enable the unit to accumulate a large supply of spare equipment. So much for the conditions. As to the financial profit and loss, I do not think I need here take up your time by going into the further details or by balancing savings with extra expenditure. You have the figures,\* and know that we would seem, at the first blush, to save twelve and three-quarter millions sterling per annum by such a revolution of system, of which sum six and three-quarter millions would be increased Indian and Colonial contributions, leaving a real reduction of six millions. So far so good; but it is the military cost of

\* See Appendix VII.

the proposal which entirely puts it out of court from my point of view. The saving, in fact, is far too expensive ! The whole Expeditionary Force of six Divisions, composed at present of the finest troops in Europe, would be wiped out. I repeat advisedly, the finest troops in Europe, not as one puffed up with national conceit, but because they ought to be the finest, largely composed, as they will be, of young veterans, men under thirty who have done seven years' service, including probably some active service, with the Colours. There are those amongst us, I am aware, who adopt the magnificent attitude of despising six Divisions of British Regulars with the newly created Special Reserve standing behind them to keep them up to strength. They are fond of quoting a remark of Prince Bismarck's (authentic or not, who knows ?) to the effect that if the British Army landed on the continent he would have to send the police to make them prisoners. They forget that at the time the *mot* was supposed to have been made Great Britain and Ireland could not, literally, have embarked one Division for war within any reasonable time, as time in war is counted. They forget that these six Divisions are not standing in

the air, but that behind them is the might of England, her half-trained men, her money, her horses, guns, munitions, science. Finally they do not actually, personally, know the General Staffs of foreign armies, or realise how hateful to those methodical minds is the idea of the shifting base and incalculable line of communications of a Power in command of the sea.

Under Scheme (1) then, the money-saving sounds magnificent, but the six Expeditionary Divisions are indubitably lost. The adoption of such a system must mean a falling back on to the pure defensive—an attitude immemorially precursive of destruction—and be it noted that the whole of our existing regular Coast-defence troops (Artillery and Engineers) at home have similarly gone by the board. Therefore, if we are to continue to exist, even on sufferance, we must, in addition to the new, 315,000 strong, Home-Defence Army, create a new equivalent to our present Expeditionary Force and our Coast-defence troops at Home. Working, as hitherto, on the German model, we must add 100,000 men to the peace establishment of 123,000 already given. Unfortunately, the cost of such an addition will not only eat up the

saving of six millions I have indicated, but would actually cause the new system to exceed the cost of our present system by a million and a half.

Militarily we should be practically as we are at present, only that :

(a) The conscript Home-Defence Army would always be up to full strength, and would be considerably better trained, disciplined, and generally more efficient than the Territorials whom they would replace. How much more efficient depends entirely on the period for which the Territorials are supposed to have been embodied when the comparison is made. (I will advise you on this obscure point later, for to do so here would break the thread of my argument.)

(b) The conscript Expeditionary Force would be (as has been shown in discussing the general subject) inferior to our present Expeditionary Force for continental purposes and would be useless, or nearly so, for Asiatic or African purposes.

(c) Our long-service Over-seas Army would be less effective in war than our present type of seven-years-colour-service Army. It would have no reserves to fall back upon for any serious campaign.

(d) A certain weakening of central autho-



rity must ensue, in so far as we should have to permit India and the Colonies to establish by their depots, containing armed men, an *imperium in imperio*.

(e) The numbers drawn by the ballot would be so small compared with the able-bodied male population, that the conscript on whom the lot fell would feel that his was the exceptional rather than the common lot. A sense of hardship might thus be engendered, from which the universality of the obligation saves the continental conscript.

(f) Provided that, as abroad, no conscripts were taken before twenty, it is possible that a conscript Home-Defence Army of such modest dimensions would interfere but little with recruiting for the long-service Over-seas Army, although I do not myself believe many recruits would be drawn from the ranks of the conscripts.

I have tried to put all the points as they occur to me. What you have to consider is whether the advantage shown in (a) counterbalances the drawbacks disclosed in (b), (c), (d), (e), plus the extra cost of one million and a half. Under the suggested scheme we should, I submit, feel absolutely secure from invasion at home, and we should be at least as powerful for action on the Continent as

at present. For, supposing the new Home-Defence Army to be twice as efficient as the existing Territorials, then, under many easily imagined conditions, first a portion and then the whole of the Home-Defence Army might be shipped off to support the Expeditionary Force in any not too distant part of Europe.

Another way of regarding the problem, in the light of the assumed superior value of the Conscript Army to the Territorial Force, is that if 315,000 conscript soldiers are really worth 630,000 Territorials, then we might do with half the number, and content ourselves with a Home-Defence Army of, say, a war strength of 160,000. Thus we should save three or four millions per annum; be theoretically as safe at home as we are to-day, and retain an Expeditionary Force as good, or nearly as good, for service in Western Europe as our existing six Divisions. But here we enter upon treacherous ground. After all, are we so certain that the number 315,000 hits the exact mean between economy and safety? I think perhaps not. The Territorial Reserve has been recently inaugurated to fill up the gap between establishment and strength which must always exist with a

voluntary system. The Veteran Reserve, when, as I hope may soon be the case, it steps off paper on to the parade ground, will be extra to the 315,000. Further, and most important, under our existing system there is a very considerable margin of enlisted men available in one way or another to swell the cadres for home defence should necessity arise. On September 30, 1909, our actual number of Regular soldiers at home, including Army Reserve and Special Reserve, was 339,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and men. Under a conscription system there would be no margin. It would be safer, then, not to look on the superior efficiency of a conscript Home-Defence Army as affording an excuse for cutting down rifles below the present Territorial standard, and to content ourselves with the fact that owing to that superiority we should be safe in England, and something more formidable within a radius of three or four hundred miles from our island base than we are to-day.

Against this must be set the fact that in Asia, Africa, and America we should be very much weaker than at present. Although India now pays for her Army, the troops remain by tradition, by reliefs of

units, by free interchange at all times of officers, non-commissioned officers and men, essentially a part of the Home army. Were India to establish her flesh-and-blood markets in Great Britain, and buy officers for their effective lives, and men for twenty-one years, their sentiment of homogeneity with their conscript comrades in Great Britain and Ireland would soon begin to wear thin. Still more so as regards South Africa. If an African Government enlisted and carried off officers and men to serve in the Transvaal for twenty-one years, what would be their value to Greater Britain? Add to these drawbacks the fact insisted upon earlier in the paper, namely, that conscripts are not suited for a central reserve Force for Imperial purposes! I doubt, Mr. Haldane, if the game is worth the candle. But let us proceed to try to find something better in the proposals of the National Service League.

We now come to (2), the latest scheme for compulsory service on a Militia\* basis put forward by the National Service League. For the idea of a force of a million men trained on a Regular, or Special Reserve\*

\* *Militia* in the sense defined at p. 56, not involving life in barracks, even during the period of recruit drill. The "Special Reserve" basis involves life in barracks for recruits.



basis, has been killed by the discovery that its acceptance would involve an increase to Army Estimates of twenty millions sterling per annum.

The proposal which now holds the field is that the whole manhood of the nation, subject to certain medical and other rejections, should become liable to do their turn of compulsory service on the 1st of January following the attainment of their eighteenth birthday. On joining, the recruit is to receive four to six months' training, varying with the arm, and in his second, third, and fourth years he is to undergo fifteen days' continuous training and to be put through a course of musketry. From his fourth year until he is thirty, a man will receive no further training, but will be liable to embodiment in case of imminent national danger. He will not be liable at any time to be ordered out of the kingdom. The existing Territorial Force would disappear. The Special Reserve would be abolished and would be replaced by men serving compulsorily in the Territorial Force, who would be induced by a money payment to accept a liability for service abroad in case of emergency. The Regular Army would remain. It is calculated, correctly I believe,

that 150,000 recruits would be called up annually. When this machinery was in full swing its out-turn would be 400,000 trained men, organised in cadres, as well as 600,000 men in reserve, for which latter category the scheme provides no arms, clothing, equipment or organisation of any sort or kind. The League estimate the additional cost of adopting their proposals at four millions sterling per annum.

I will now give you my views on this scheme.

To take the last point first: your financial adviser has shown you already that the estimate of an additional four millions sterling is under the mark by one half. Figures, it has been said, can be made to prove anything. Figures, in fact, are like a pile of first-class modern rifles. Each in itself is accuracy materialised, is gauged to one-thousandth of an inch, is capable of making a bull's-eye every time at the distance of a mile. How, then, do we account for the disconcerting fact that the marksman often brings down the crow instead of the pigeon? Sometimes because he is a bad, inexperienced shot. More often because, also, whilst ostensibly aiming at the pigeon he deliberately draws a bead

on the crow. Everything, in short, depends upon the sportsman behind the gun—the authority who manipulates the figures. Here you are surely on very safe ground. Not only is your adviser a man of rare ability, but he has had no brief from one side or the other, and his experience is absolutely unique. I take it, then, as certain that your figures are the best and fairest obtainable, and that the actual extra cost of the proposals just set forth would be some eight millions sterling per annum.

From an ex-Adjutant-General's point of view, the arrangement whereby in exchange for the Special Reserve we are to be given a number of individuals without any unit or other organisation, is pernicious. Further, the infantrymen, as recruits, would be two-thirds less thoroughly trained than are our present Special Reserve.

About three-fifths of the recruits for the Regular Army enlist between October and March, and the General Annual Report of the Army shows that nearly half the total of recruits raised every year are eighteen and under nineteen. This is the age at which the League proposes to claim lads for the Territorial Force. Neither the Bill nor the Memorandum supplies direct information as

to the months during which it is intended to train recruits. The League calculates that there will be 150,000 for training every year; but as it apparently does not contemplate the provision of extra barrack accommodation, it was probably the intention of the promoters of the Bill that recruit training should take place under canvas. It is extremely improbable that these recruits could be trained during the summer, for whenever numbers of men were out of work, public opinion would bring strong pressure to bear with a view to ensuring that every man drawn for service was at least given the option of undergoing his training during the winter. The argument that winter is the time when a recruit would derive least benefit from his training would carry little weight with Employers' Associations, Trade Unions, and Benefit Societies. Another consideration making winter almost inevitably the normal training season is that labour is so scarce in country districts that there is no other time of year when so large a number of hands could be spared from agricultural work. These views represent more than mere personal observation. They are the results of experience gained by a careful



and responsible study of the recruiting market and the various factors by which it is dominated.

The majority of eighteen- to nineteen-year-old regular recruits enlist because they have just ceased to be boys and are unable to find regular employment as men. About four-fifths of them come to us because they cannot get a job at fifteen shillings a week. The immense work of national regeneration the Army has been unostentatiously performing by helping these lads and making fine men of them is quite unknown to the average citizen. But that by the way. The reluctance of employers to take weedy, overgrown youths of seventeen and eighteen has markedly increased since the introduction of the Workmen's Compensation Act. This is good for recruiting. But if, under altered conditions, hungry hobbledehoys knew that they would be called up for continuous housing and feeding during the winter, the Regular Army would begin to shrivel up from the roots. I know that all this is not very glorious, but it is true. There are some youths who enlist because they have been crossed in love; some whose nerve of romance has been thrilled by stories of heroes and battles of the past;

some who naïvely confess that they were charmed into enlisting by music, and that a military band at guard-mounting first turned their fancy towards the Army; some there are, also—and they are the very best—whose fathers were old soldiers. But these, all told, are only one-fifth of the total in the generality of infantry battalions.

It may be argued :

(1) That some young men might still join the Regular Army between their eighteenth birthday and the end of the year.

(2) That it is not in any case proposed to prevent men from volunteering from the Territorial Force to the Regular Army.

As regards (1), lads who found themselves out of work towards the end of a year would have an inducement to try to hold out till the new year, knowing they would then get State employment of a sort just calculated to tide them over hard times until work grew brisk in summer.

As regards (2), most of those who, under present conditions, enlist during the early months of the year would at that time be already paid, housed, and clothed at the expense of the State. Would the experi-

ences thus gained be likely to tempt 35,000 of them, or, admitting the doubtful assumption that our recruiters are still able to pick up 10,000 youths in the open market, say 25,000 of them, to take up the military career as a profession? Here is the crux of the whole matter. I have already approached it indirectly several times. My view is clear, that the present type of recruit would not take on in anything approaching his present numbers. Our own experiment of 1902-04 is pretty conclusive there. It is maintained by optimists that a new class—the superior artisans' sons and the sons of small shopkeepers—would acquire a taste for the military life during their compulsory training as recruits. To me this notion appears too fanciful. It would delight me to believe it, for in believing it I should be paying a compliment to the virility and love of adventure of my own race. But, speaking as an official so lately responsible, I cannot advise you that the type of youth referred to, having been compelled against his inclination to serve, would be drawn by his experiences voluntarily to prolong that service. The only fact tending to support such a view is that during the Napoleonic wars a considerable

number of compulsorily enlisted militiamen were tempted by bounties to join the armies in the field. But the compulsory system had not been fully enough established then to have got a grip upon the sentiment of the country, and, secondly, it is not here a question of war and its excitements, but of humdrum garrison work in peace. Again, on page 12\* of the League Estimate it is argued that because, under the voluntary system, no difficulty was experienced in getting militiamen to engage to serve with regulars abroad in case of war, there is no reason why a similar bounty of £1 10s. should not prove similarly attractive to the new conscript Home-Defence men. The same idea is elaborated in the *League Journal*, where the point is constantly made that if the voluntarily enlisted Territorial stimulates recruiting by acquiring a liking for professional soldiering, so will the conscripted Territorial of the future help to popularise what will then quickly come to be looked upon as mercenary service! I submit to you that here is a certain misconception of the working and weight of moral forces.

You will gather, then, that I am by no

\* See p. 177.



means sanguine as to the prospect of drawing a sufficient number of eighteen-year-old youths either from the open market or from the ranks of the Home-Defence Force, were the National Service League system now to be put in force.

I fear I have been forced to show that compulsory home service, with continuous recruit training, must deprive the Regular Army of many thousands of eighteen to nineteen years old recruits. What remains? The men over nineteen years of age. But, obviously, the annual withdrawal of large numbers of men from civil life would make it easier for men of nineteen and over to obtain civil employment. It is true that men might enlist in the Army after they had finished their recruit training, but they would be released from training in the summer, when work is plentiful and the winter wolf still seems far from the door. They might do so; but would they do so? Experience in the Adjutant-General's Department says No!

Again, coincident with the grave recruiting difficulties I have foreshadowed as a result of the adoption of the proposals of the League, more, and not fewer, recruits would be required for the Regular Army.

For, even when credit has been taken for the difference between the Regular establishments of the Special Reserve and the Depot establishments which will still be required, it would be necessary to increase the establishment of the Regular Army in order to provide the larger Permanent Staffs and the new cadres, especially for Ireland, without which the annual contingent of Home-Defence recruits could not be trained.

The course of my investigation has now led me to touch upon five conceivable methods whereby our military strength might be so increased, modified, or redistributed, as to give us more troops for service in Western Europe and, consequently, more self-confidence at home. These methods were :

(1) The enlargement of our present type of Over-seas Army ;

(2) Universal Military Service on the German model ;

(3) Universal Military Service on a Special Reserve basis ;

(4) A Home-Defence Army and Expeditionary Force on the German model, but restricted in strength to the present establishment of the Territorial Force on the one hand ; on the other,

to the strength of our existing Expeditionary Force of six Divisions ;

(5) Compulsory service on a Militia basis, as proposed by the National Service League.

The motive underlying each of these proposals would be much the same as that actuating the Admiralty when they strengthened the naval position in home waters partly by drawing in ships from outstations, partly by actual increases to the Fleet. Our military problem is less simple. Naval reductions in the Mediterranean, or in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, affect nothing, except perhaps our prestige, so long as peace is maintained ; whereas any serious reduction of the white garrison in India might in itself precipitate bloodshed. As to actual increases, these are voted readily enough for the Navy, but only once in a blue moon do they commend themselves to Parliament where we of the Army are concerned.

Taking now the five methods aforesaid in their order :

- (1) is impracticable on any sufficient scale.
- (2) is far too costly.
- (3) is still too costly.
- (4) is practicable. The additional cost

would not be large. Recruiting for the Regular Army would be hardly, if at all, affected. The sum total of our military strength would be left much as it stands at present, but, by fortifying the heart at the expense of the extremities, it would be differently apportioned.

(5) The expense would be very heavy, but perhaps not prohibitive. Its adoption would, however, in all human probability, gravely prejudice recruiting for the Regular Army. You have now a new Adjutant-General, and as soon as he is fairly in the saddle you should consult him on this point. Writing as an ex-Adjutant-General, it is my firm opinion that the acceptance of the proposals of the National Service League as they stand at present would within two years bring about something very like disaster in the recruiting market for the Regular Army.

Is there then no method by which we can strengthen ourselves at and near home, without great additional expenditure and without weakening ourselves upon the Imperial frontiers? I think there is; but before making my recommendations it is absolutely necessary I should diverge for some little time into a consideration of the



value, actual and potential, of our Territorial Force as it stands.

The points we must weigh are, briefly :

(1) The actual war-value of the fourteen Territorial Divisions.

(2) The probable war-value of the fourteen Territorial Divisions two or three years hence, when they will contain a due proportion of four-years men; when the first-line reserve will have begun to fill up; when the Veteran and Technical Reserves will have taken shape; when rifle and artillery ranges will have been rendered available to every unit, and when mobilisation, equipment, and stores have been not only purchased and stored but actually handed over to the County Associations. All these improvements will either take place automatically or have been worked out and already approved of in principle.

(3) The potential war-value of the fourteen Territorial Divisions two or three years hence, were expenditure not yet contemplated to be sanctioned. I think you know how and where the shoe pinches the Territorial, both literally and metaphorically. A few hundred thousands a year in travelling expenses to drills and to rifle ranges and in facilitating week-end camps; in a carefully

guarded extension, here and there, to the establishment of Permanent Staff; in making it easier for the men to get the right boots for their training; such measures as these would increase both efficiency and numbers out of all proportion to the extra cost involved. If, after full consideration, the General Staff think our establishment has been fixed at too low a point, I believe it could then be raised. Add a Cyclist Company to each battalion of infantry; you put on some 8,000 men at a stroke. Select certain favourable districts for the creation of corps troops. Or, more simply, if less symmetrically, permit units up to strength to recruit above establishment.

The existing fourteen Divisions of the Territorial Force possess better fighting value than is admitted by their critics or claimed by their friends. So I must maintain, even though the pronouncement may smack of presumption. Want of acquaintance with Territorial standards on the part of most military officers, and want of experience of Regular standards by most Territorial officers, are the causes of the double misapprehension. As to the professor the new pupil may appear insignificant, so to the pupil the unknown professor must seem

magnificent. Let them but work together for a year, and the one may loom less imposingly, whilst the other will assuredly grow taller. When a larger number of Regular officers are by degrees brought into contact with our citizen soldiers they will learn to appreciate the full difference between a fourteen to fifteen shilling a week hobbledehoy and a twenty-five shilling to thirty shilling a week man (a type they have never handled). They will then be in a better position to understand how more instruction than seemed heretofore possible can be crammed into a period of time which would be of very little value to the regular recruit. Again, if a certain number of Territorial officers can be sent at State expense to British and Continental manœuvres, they may, whilst learning a great deal, manage at the same time to acquire a better conceit of themselves. Thus, from Regulars and Territorials alike, the cousins and aunts who practically rule England may grow to understand that things are not so desperately bad as in some quarters they are represented to be.

But there is more than mere want of knowledge at the back of the existing, almost universal, depreciation of our Terri-

torials. There has been put into circulation a statement, official or semi-official, which, being misinterpreted, has largely helped to transform ignorance into prejudice. The Territorials, it has been said, would be able to fight Continental troops after being embodied for six months. That is no doubt the truth, but it is a truth carrying with it to the uninstructed public the damning implication that they would not be prepared to fight before that time. Such generalisations are always extremely unsafe. This one is particularly dangerous, seeing it took hold of the mind of the country before Napoleon himself could have said how the Territorials were going to turn out. Now we do know a little about the matter, and it may safely be said that the statement went too far or not far enough. If it means that at the end of six months' embodiment Territorial troops could cherish reasonable hopes of defeating first-line Continental Regular troops in the open field, on even terms, rifle for rifle, gun for gun, why, then it goes too far. If it is to be held to imply that Territorial troops are so wanting in soldierly qualities and training that they could not be used to fight continental troops to-morrow, then it is at least equally mis-



leading. I can name you brigades of Territorials ready and available to be entrained and sent off at a few hours' notice. Taking with them three days' rations and three hundred rounds, they would fight any one you like to name at daybreak to-morrow morning, this being 3 p.m. They would conduct themselves with more zeal than skill. They would suffer heavy losses. Proportionately the enemy's losses would be slight. If defeated, they would go absolutely to pieces for a time. Still, were they respectably handled and were they in a superiority of say three to one, they would fight well enough to give the best of enemies a bellyful.

Every day would make a difference. At the end of a month's embodiment it would be a different story. At the end of six months' embodiment it would be a very different story. By that time, in my opinion, a twenty-five per cent superiority in numbers ought to give them a fair fighting chance, and a superiority of half as many again ought to give them a good chance of the victory, especially as we must always bear in mind that after six months' war a Continental army would not consist so much of first-line troops

as of Reserves. In such case our Territorials should be almost, if not quite, their equals.

In the foregoing estimates (to which you will attach just so much importance as may be warranted by my personal experiences) I am assuming existing conditions. On the one hand, I do not allow for any further improvement which may, nay, must, take place in the Territorial Force; on the other, I assume that even although our full six Divisions have quitted the country, there remain (as there must remain) some thousands of odds and ends of Regulars to give here and there some guidance, example, point, and coherence to the ranks of the Territorial Divisions. A few battalions of Guards, some batteries of Horse Artillery, and some battalions of Special Reserve, would also be available to lend a hand under any conditions I can conceive. Finally, I assume, as I have already indicated, that the Territorials will be handled by some one who understands them. A freshly embodied Militia may not be marched off their legs or manœuvred in precisely the same way as the Brigade of Guards might with advantage be marched or manœuvred. If the

enemy would like to have the fate of England staked upon one great battle fought over open ground, a sort of second Battle of Hastings, in fact, he must not be indulged. One of the numerous qualities we demand (and sometimes do not get) in a General, is the art of playing up to the characteristics of his troops. Those, then, who lead Territorials in war should have had some experience of them in peace.

I have tried to show that want of knowledge, aggravated by the misapprehension of the statement about the six months, are each in their way responsible for the low prevailing estimates of Territorial efficiency. But I think I can lay my finger on one more reason for this unwonted fit of modesty on the part of the British nation.

The moral factor, the greatest factor of all, seems to have received but scant consideration at the hands of any of the critics. Foreign officers are more generous. They admit that our Regular Army is sure to fight well, because the men are volunteers, and may therefore be presumed to be by nature combative. But I have explained that only a small proportion of our Regular recruits join from a compelling love of soldiering, whereas in the Territorials there is hardly

a man who has not joined for the express object of having a good fight if any fighting happens to come his way. There is hardly a Territorial, I believe, who does not, at the bottom of his heart, hope to go into one historic battle during his military existence. Otherwise why should he be there, sweating and toiling during his holiday—attacking, defending, aiming? Defence of hearth and home? Yes; but he will be delighted, not downhearted, like some others of his fellow-countrymen, when he hears that the invaders have landed.

Napoleon has told us that the moral is to the physical as three is to one. The Scriptures tell us that "where there is no vision the people perish." Clausewitz has said, "In the combat the loss of moral force is the chief cause of the decision." Blindness to moral forces and worship of material forces inevitably lead in war to destruction. All that exaggerated reliance placed upon chassepots and mitrailleuses by France before '70; all that trash written by M. Bloch before 1904 about zones of fire across which no living being could pass, heralded nothing but disaster. War is essentially the triumph, not of a chassepot over a needle-gun, not of a line of men entrenched behind



wire entanglements and fire-swept zones over men exposing themselves in the open, but of one will over another weaker will. Are we then to leave our voluntary spirit, a spirit dead or dying upon the Continent, entirely out of the count? Are we to imagine young men whose elders, safe from service themselves, have passed a law compelling them to serve willy-nilly—are we to imagine them animated by the same moral force as young men who have joined the Colours from sheer love of them? If so, then all I can say is, Napoleon must be wrong, and the ideal which has guided British theory and practice for centuries must be wrong and doubly wrong!

You remember, do you not, the parade of detachments of Territorials at Windsor? There were assembled together fishermen from the misty islands of the North, miners from the West, countrymen from South and East, artisans from Birmingham, and all sorts and conditions of life from the great melting-pot of London. They had come from all points of the compass to receive their Colours from their King. At two continental capitals have I seen a similar parade; and you may take my word for it that in no essential point did

our ceremonial suffer from the comparison. Regular officers present were amazed. How could the thing have been achieved ? Some tried to explain the miracle by saying that the officer in charge had a genius for organising and instructing in spectacular displays. I believe that to be the case. I believe the Territorials were given every possible chance to show the metal they were made of. But can men be taught to march, to handle arms, to salute and to stand steady in the ranks, in twenty-four hours ? The fact of the parade passing off, not only without a hitch, but faultlessly, lay deeper than any surface organisation or instructions issued on the spot and at the last moment. The men were first-class men—free men ; alive to the business on hand and previously prepared to perform it so as to reflect credit on their corps. To a civilian, a spectacular show may seem as far removed as anything well can be from the realities of war ; but it is none the less the case that a great notion of service efficiency can be obtained by watching how men of fighting race carry themselves on great occasions.

It is a commonplace of military literature that a Militia cannot hold its own against Regulars. But there is not a soldier who

would not admit also that the moral out-values the material. Indeed, Monongahela, Lexington, Bunker's Hill, Jemappes, Baylen, Prestonpans, Falkirk, Valmy, Maiwand, and Majuba show that there must be another side to the story, and that, even in days when volley-firing and close formations lent special value to strictest discipline, enthusiasm has sometimes found means to redress the balance.

Elands-laagte was a hard-fought action. Famous regiments were there, well represented. Joined unto them was the Imperial Light Horse. The corps held its first parade as a unit on October 8, 1899, when it was inspected by Sir Archibald Hunter at Pietermaritzburg. I saw the men at work for several hours next day. The material was excellent. Mining engineers, lawyers, stock-brokers, land surveyors, foremen of native labour gangs, and artisans, shop assistants and clerks. Morale was exceptional, the corps being animated through and through by a burning desire to vindicate the fighting honour of their race, impugned in South Africa since Majuba and, more than ever, since the raid. A fine body of men had been organised into a unit and had received its equipment, but discipline and corporate

training had naturally not yet come into existence. On the 21st of that same month was fought Elandslaagte, on a small scale one of the sharpest actions of the war. I watched the Imperial Light Horse carefully in the second advance, and was near them in the fight.

By this time their standard of military efficiency, from the point of view of the training ground, was about as near as can be that of a good British Yeomanry regiment of our existing forces after it has been, say, one week in camp. Individually the Imperial Light Horse were better educated and more able to think and act for themselves, but what they gained in this respect over our Yeomanry (physically fully their equals) was lost again by their relative lack of homogeneity.

In the ensuing action our troops received a free invitation to fill their bellies full of fighting. "Let the little newspaper boys in London proclaim a British victory in the streets to-morrow morning," was the word, or hortative, given. Here are our losses, surest guide, in victory or defeat, of the stiffness of the affair:

Cavalry	..	..	..	..	·34
Artillery	..	..	..	..	1·50



Devons	..	..	..	..	3·98
Manchesters	..	..	..	..	12·72
Gordons	..	..	..	..	28·94
Imperial Light Horse			..	..	15·97

You will observe that the Territorial regiment, less highly trained than our own present Yeomanry at the close of their annual camp, emerges by no means so badly from a comparison with its Regular comrades. Also please note, as confirmatory of what has been said as to the value of the moral element in war, that the Gordons, like the Imperial Light Horse, were sustained by a special animus, the rankling memory of Majuba.

When considering the voluntary principle, do not (now that the time of danger seems past) listen to those who would belittle the services of levies sent us in our hour of direct need by self-governing and Crown Colonies. Good wine needs no bush; and it would be superfluous indeed were I to recapitulate the deeds of these corps who, in their first encounters with the enemy, were assuredly neither more highly trained nor disciplined than our existing Territorials. Also, pause a moment to consider, in the case of each of those units, whether, had they been raised on a com-

pulsory basis for home defence, we should have had the benefit of their assistance.

Yet another example from the South African War, an example this time which has been freely used against the voluntary idea. I refer to the City Imperial Volunteers. If you will turn up my evidence given before the Royal Commission on the South African War you will see that I, speaking as their responsible Commander, expressed the following opinion regarding the corps :

*Question 13905.* "I think you had a good opinion of the City Imperial Volunteers ?"—"Yes ; they ripened very quickly. They improved before my eyes. At the crossing of the Zand River was the first time I let them go at all, and I was not quite sure of them, but they were all right, and then they did better still at Doornkop, and at Diamond Hill they did very well indeed."

Again, giving evidence before the Duke of Norfolk's Royal Commission, I said :

*Question 1145.* (Chairman) "Now as regards the Volunteers ?"—"I had the City Imperial Volunteers when they started, and afterwards I had the Elswick Battery Volunteers ; I think I am within the mark

in saying I must have had over 30 Volunteer Service Companies at different times under me; and, generally speaking, I think it would be difficult to overpraise them. I think that they were wonderfully good. Shortly after the City Imperial Volunteers joined me, in May, we fought the Zand River action. I was not quite sure about them then, and I do not think they were quite sure of themselves, but they did very well."

*Question 1146.* "Do you mean that you were not sure of them before the action?"—"When I saw them during the action they did not show the dash and go and confidence that they developed later. About a fortnight later, in quite a serious action at Doornkop, at Johannesburg, General Bruce Hamilton, owing perhaps to indistinct orders from me, extended too far to his left, leaving a gap in our centre between my two Infantry Brigades. The City Imperial Volunteers were on his left, and I had to ask him to draw them in under fire; this is a very high test, and the C.I.V.'s came through it excellently. Altogether, that day they behaved exceedingly well. At Diamond Hill I had the good fortune to be associated with some very distinguished regiments,

and I can only say I do not wish to serve with any better regiments than the City Imperial Volunteers were then. . . .”

This has not been denied, no one being likely to try to traverse the statement. But it has been urged that the C.I.V. took so long to attain to this standard that they thereby demonstrated what must be the special weakness of any voluntary militia system.

Now, the C.I.V. were embodied on January 4, 1900. One wing embarked for South Africa on January 13, the other on January 20. The dates of Zand River, Doornkop, and Diamond Hill are respectively May 10, 1900, May 29, 1900, and June 12, 1900. I have, in my evidence above quoted, stated that at the last-named action the C.I.V. were the equal, in fighting efficiency, of a regular battalion of the Line. Permit me, however, to remind you that, in my main argument, I have not assumed that a Territorial battalion will be the equal of a Regular battalion even after six months. Here the corps in question undoubtedly did attain the full Regular fighting value within less than six months of its formation, one month of which time was spent comparatively ineffectually at sea. Further, it is hardly



fair to compare a scratch battalion made up from 47 units, commanded by officers drawn from sixteen different battalions (even if eight of these officers were Regulars) with a homogeneous Territorial battalion rooted, as it must be under the new system, in a life and local tradition of its own, bearing the title of an old-established Regular corps and officered by fellow-townsmen or gentlemen drawn from the neighbourhood of its headquarters. In certain cases the homogeneity of our new Territorial units is even closer. I know batteries and companies of Engineers where the manager of some great factory commands a rank and file composed entirely of his own employees, officered by his deputy managers and foremen. I know of squadrons of Yeomanry where the bulk of the men are the sons of the tenants and small farmers of the squadron leader. Whether for war or peace, the value of such a combination is difficult to exaggerate. Under a system of compulsory service its benefits must all be surrendered.

A fairer comparison for the purpose of estimating the potential value of our present system (although, I admit, not entirely fair) would be that of the Volunteer companies sent out to join their own Regular

battalions later on in the war. Read the evidence given before the War Commission, and see how, in a comparatively brief period, these became the acknowledged equals of their comrades of the Line.

I fear you may think I have been wasting your time and my own by urging, with so much insistence, that the moral factor should be given its due weight in a discussion on the merits of rival military systems. At the first blush it might seem superfluous to vindicate a maxim of Napoleon's. It would be so were it not that the present generation seems more inclined to gape with admiration at a complicated piece of machinery or at some vast palatial edifice, than to spare one thought for the high, resolute intellect of the poor devil who invented or designed these marvels.

Schemes based entirely on material considerations may endure for a while in peace. But war searches the innermost part and the uttermost corner. It is on moral forces we must stand or fall in battle; and I ask you to consider whether these are most likely to be found living and active amongst volunteers or amongst conscripts.

I do not really know if you were ever

imprisoned in that confused region of thought wherein wiseacres discuss the dates by which Territorials might be trusted to fight. If so, I trust I have helped you to escape, and to realise that our friends the Territorials may be relied upon to put up a fight, effective or not according to their standard of discipline, training and equipment, the moment (be it to-morrow or a year hence) they are ordered to take the field. They will fight; but do not expect miracles. I have advised you that our existing Territorials, after being embodied for six months, might reasonably expect to defeat a first - line hostile Regular force if they outnumbered that force considerably. Also that by such a date they should be able to hold their own with continental troops consisting mostly of reserves. In proportion as the period of embodiment is shortened, so must you increase your numerical superiority.

So far, I have been writing of the Territorial Force as it actually stands at present. But obviously the last word has not yet been said on Territorial efficiency. There is room for much progress. Partly we may expect this progress to be automatic: the annual improvement of officers and non-commissioned officers; the eventual inclu-

sion in the ranks of a due proportion of men of four years' service. Partly we must hope, and we do hope, that progress will be accelerated and brought about by supplementary expenditure. Many of my comrades of the Regular Army understand perfectly well how quickly the Territorial ship would respond to the provision of the additional ha'porth of tar. Yet they hesitate to encourage you to be liberal, because they think that any addition to expenditure on the Territorial Force must be made, ultimately, at the cost of the Regular Army. But I submit that until some such ruinous proposition takes actual shape, they are not justified in framing their military opinions upon suppositions concerning policy. For myself at least, I do not hesitate to advise you to brush aside all problematical forecasts and to press on double-quick time with your efforts to raise the Territorial standard—provided always you conclude definitely in favour of the maintenance of the existing system.

At a length which must, I fear, have wearied you, I have now at least shown you, as it were in rough framework, the general shape, scope, and structure of several diverse military systems. But before electing for



the type which seems most suitable, I beg you to have still a little patience and to revolve in your mind the various military policies open to such an Empire as that of Greater Britain. At present I distinguish three possible policies, and I seem also to be conscious of a fourth method, although that, as yet, only vaguely emerges from the background of my thought :

### FIRST POLICY

#### *(The Imperial Policy)*

- (1) A long-range Regular Force raised by voluntary enlistment.
- (2) A Regular, central Reserve based on voluntary enlistment.
- (3) A voluntarily enlisted Militia.

(1) and (2) provide the foreign garrisons and the Expeditionary Force. (3), stiffened by such Regulars as are not absorbed by (1) and (2), supplies the force for Home Defence in the first instance ; for reinforcement of the Expeditionary Force (when the danger of invasion does not exist or has passed away) in the second. It should be numerous enough and well enough trained to deal with any invading army whose modest dimen-

sions might have enabled it to slip through the meshes of our naval defence.

## SECOND POLICY

### *(The Continental or European Policy)*

(1) A short-range, regular, national Army raised by conscription on the German model. (For reasons of expense, more exemptions would have to be made than on the Continent, so as to keep our strength proportionately lower.)

(2) A Regular force raised by voluntary enlistment to garrison India and the over-sea stations. (For reasons of expense, linked units serving at home would be disbanded and replaced by depots. The men would be enlisted for long service. Special Reserve battalions would be abolished. Long-range reinforcements could only be obtained by tempting individuals from the national Army to volunteer.)

The foregoing is a practicable policy. If, as was stated the other day in that sober paper *Le Siècle*, "the destruction of the European equilibrium would bring with it

the ruin of the British Empire without much delay"—if such a statement is accepted—then an army on a continental scale may be required for service in Europe, and it becomes conceivable that a military system such as I have described is the paramount necessity for Greater Britain.

### THIRD POLICY

#### *(The Home-Defence Policy)*

(1) A Home-Defence Militia raised on a national compulsory basis.

(2) A Regular Force as in (2) of the "Second Policy." (It should be noted that such a Force could furnish few, if any, surplus troops wherewith to stiffen (1).)

This third policy (less (2), which is inapplicable to those countries) is, at the moment I write, being frankly adopted by Australia, New Zealand and, possibly, South Africa. In the widely read editorial paragraphs of *The Observer* newspaper of July 8, 1910, a similar system is suggested for our own adoption; not, be it remarked, as an incident of, or auxiliary to, Imperial Defence, but as a means of making Home Defence

our paramount military policy. I quote the extract, as it will convey to you, with brilliant clearness and brevity, a conception of war which has been held in turn by the Poles and by the Boers.

“ . . . We may have, if we choose, a citizen reserve of some 2,000,000 well-trained men at a less cost than that of our more artificial and hopelessly inadequate professional Army of to-day. Then, and not until then, our shores will be impregnable, our alliances will be secure, our naval predominance will be indirectly, but most powerfully reinforced, and the maintenance of the Empire will be guaranteed. A citizen force of that kind never could be used as an instrument of aggression, but it would be a tremendous potentiality for defence in a supreme crisis, and it would lay a new foundation for national health, as well as for national safety.”

There is nothing equivocal about the proposal. We are to destroy our “artificial” professional Army, the artificiality thereof being presumably its military spirit. We are, in lieu, to create an enormous, compulsorily enlisted Militia, and make it the mainstay of our whole system of Imperial defence. I am trying to write in an



impartial spirit and to discover whether anything helpful to us can be found in any proposal seriously put forward. But here, I confess, I see nothing but harm and danger.

The threat of invasion either is, or is not, a reality.

If it is a reality, and if a highly trained Regular force of seventy thousand men could be landed in England, where is the General who is ambitious to face them with such a monstrous agglomeration of half-baked, conscript militiamen? Hannibal, with 20,000 professional soldiers, went near to destroying the Republic of Rome, which had some seven or eight hundred thousand men available for its conscript Militia. He sat down amongst those Militia conscripts and lived for a long time happily and well, as it might be at Birmingham, snug as a snail in a hive full of honey. Difficulties of marching and manœuvring increase with the numbers employed, and the larger the force the more necessary that its components should be "artificial," to accept the new and clever differentiation between the soldier and the militiaman.

No; if we are to turn 70,000 continental Regulars into a monument, let us, whatever happens, find a few thousand Regulars in

the country at the time we are invaded. Let their Militia comrades be in manageable strength and, as far as possible, in spirit, in name and in associations assimilated to those Regulars. Our present Territorials exactly fulfil those conditions. Stiffened by the Guards, Horse Artillery, and other very considerable numbers of Regulars and Special Reserve battalions unallotted to the Expeditionary Force, they could make a manageable field army of a quarter of a million men, sufficient, I consider, for the job we have under consideration.

If, on the other hand, invasion is so improbable that it need hardly be taken into account, our reserves of national strength should be organised not for a "tremendous potentiality for defence in a supreme crisis" (the phrase embodies in highly concentrated form a maximum of military heresy), but for the purpose for which every true soldier in the kingdom would desire them, namely, the purpose of over-seas warfare.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> When the mind is concentrated on something, it is strange how books, papers, and conversations seem to combine to bring grist to the mill. Here, for instance, to-day, in Vienna of all places in the world, just as I have got so far, the London *Times*, of August 27, comes opportunely to my help. Speaking of the Canadian Regiment, its Military Correspondent says: "The supreme

## CONCLUSIONS

IN proportion as I have written so have I gradually gained the impression that in course of time political ideals must inevitably shape military systems. Our actual military system has not sprung up in so haphazard a fashion as has been imagined, but is actually the result of generations of endeavour, often by men of superior capacity, to adjust our military methods and expenditure to our needs. In no other way is it possible to explain how an organisation, seemingly such a patchwork of expedients, stands so well the test of careful comparison with organisations much more logical and

test of war showed the value of a National Militia raised upon a voluntary basis, well led and stiffened by a small but very efficient force of Regulars. The glories of Detroit, Queenstown Heights, Landy's Lane, Chrystler's Farm, and Château Gay still cause a tingle of proper pride in the heart of every true Canadian. The memorable victory of de Salaberry, an officer of the 60th Royal Americans, on October 26, 1813, who, with 360 Militia from Lower Canada, defeated an American Army of 7,000 men under General Hampton upon the banks of the Château Gay River, near Montreal, will always be remembered as a splendid feat of arms. It is an example for all time of what Militia troops, well led, can do in defence of their hearths and homes." Never a truer word written—especially that about the leaven of Regulars.

apparently more effective, but created for other ends than ours.

A new factor—a danger since several hundred years not so threatening—now begins to cast its shadow across the pathway of Imperial progress. What then? Have we not still to hold India and the coaling stations? Must we weaken that hold? Shall we, panic-stricken, destroy all that has gone before: priceless regimental traditions; the voluntary idea, typical of our race and the creator of our national glory? Would it not be wiser, as well as more valiant, to preserve what we have and make supplementary provision for the storm?

The ultimate conclusions I arrive at in my own mind are:

(1). Our last shilling must be staked, if necessary, on the maintenance of sea command.

(2) Only sailors can advise us how far that command protects us against invasion.

(3) When we are advised that no overwhelming force can be landed, we should—undisturbed by the consideration of whether this or that land force is sufficient to ward off invasion—set



ourselves deliberately to perfect the organisation of our military strength for Imperial purposes.

If a rich nation turns its mind entirely to defence, it commits the deadly sin of tempting others to transgress. By renouncing the offensive idea it goes just half-way to inviting its rivals to attack; the whole way, of course, being disarmament. It is as if a possessor of priceless jewels, living in a lawless land (for what is international law?) were to break off the point of his rapier and to turn all his energies to practising the guards. With such as he every young braggart must long to cross swords. There is so much to gain, so little to lose.

The patriotic men who are the driving power behind the appeal for compulsory service see this clearly enough, and they hope, by emphasising the danger of invasion, to secure from the people authority which may be used to forge a weapon for attack, whenever the moment to defend ourselves arises. Unfortunately, a shield is not easily convertible into a spear; still less into a projectile.

Better, then, be quite frank with the people. So we may get half a loaf out of them, in the shape of a force created for over-sea

purposes, instead of a stone in the shape of a great defensive army, of no earthly use except to hang round our necks whilst we struggle in the slough of insolvency.

This is the bold game to play; and in military affairs the bold game generally proves safest in the long run.

As to how we should proceed in perfecting our Imperial military organisation, here is my conception. You will observe that it involves the minimum of change compatible with the large potential forces it brings upon the scene.

*First Line.*—The Regular Army and Special Reserve as we know them.

*Second Line.*—The Territorial Force, very much improved as an instrument for offence as well as defence. In any case it must, in the ordinary course of things, become automatically more efficient year by year. Some folk have seemed to imagine that fourteen Divisions can be created, trained, and equipped, cheaply and on the voluntary system, within a period of two or three years. Argument is wasted upon ignorance so colossal. But you will have understood, from what I have said before, that I think the time has come when this necessarily slow process should be accelerated by the

exercise of greater liberality. The second line would be ready, just as the old Militia was ever ready, to come to the help of the Regular Army in time of real national emergency, wherever that army might be fighting. The same men who argue that, because voluntarily enlisted Territorials and Militia freely enter the Regular Army, therefore conscripts will also freely volunteer, maintain also that the Territorials will not leave England as units to fight alongside their Regular comrades. The misleading South African analogy is trotted out, when the authorities refused the offer of the Volunteers when they were enthusiastic, and then, when the enthusiasm had burnt itself out, when the war had officially been stated to be practically over, asked them to step forward. But apart from this the analogy is, for other reasons also, absolutely misleading. The Volunteer could not volunteer to go abroad in his capacity as a member of the Volunteer Force. It was not legal. If he wanted to go and help the Regulars he had first to be re-enlisted as something else. The Territorial, like the old Militiaman, can legally volunteer to go abroad, not only individually, but in his unit. I may remind you that it took us the whole period of the

Napoleonic wars to arrive at the latter ideal. Not till 1813 were Militia units allowed to volunteer for foreign service in their corporate capacity. But we are going ahead now, though so many seem to think we are asleep. Again, during the South African War the Volunteers were not embodied. They were working men earning their daily bread in situations not very easily to be regained if once they were given up. The Territorials, on the other hand, will be automatically embodied when mobilisation is ordered. They may be sent to Ireland or to Salisbury Plain or to the great fortresses of the South. No question of giving up employment will arise. The men themselves, their employers, their sweethearts, the Cabinet, will all feel and say the same: "Better fight this out on the enemy's territory than on our own. Help the Regulars and get the thing over once for all."

*Third Line.*—A great organisation which, for financial reasons, could in peace be very little more than a paper affair, but might, after the outbreak of war, become operative. Remember it was the seemingly dead paper law of 1831, creating the nominal *Garde Nationale*, which went within an ace of saving France in '70 by enabling Gam-



betta to call out the nation to fight. Had the Rhine been the Channel, with even an occasional French warship interrupting German communications, that law would have won the trick. The avowed purpose of the organisation would be the maintenance in the field during hostilities of both first and second lines. This third line organisation would be based on compulsion; but as that element would be latent, the voluntary spirit of the nation would not thereby become in any way impaired. If ever we had to call upon our third line to advance, it would be because the nation and the Empire were fighting for bare life. Only drafts, and those only for short-range European purposes, could we reasonably demand from it.

It should be possible enough to pass a Bill for such latent conscription now, in time of peace, but it might easily prove impossible for any one but a dictator to do so in time of war, yes, even though patriotism pointed clearly towards such a step. During perhaps two or three months of the South African War, conscription would have been accepted, but I put it to you that the nation would never have swallowed that dose of physic during the preliminary or

later phases of the campaign. No; not if the refusal had involved the loss of South Africa; not if the loss of South Africa had involved a mutiny in India and the secession of Canada and Australia.

But if the power was there, latent, then at the psychological moment—the statesman applies his match to the priming.

Our Expeditionary Force, plus our Territorial Force and its stiffening of unallotted Regulars, represent between them a fighting organisation of something like half a million men. All things—especially finance—considered, I question whether it is possible or necessary for us to contemplate larger military effectives for over-seas offensive purposes.

One last word. If you wish to count your bayonets by the million, you must make up your mind to retrace the steps of Empire. If you wish to maintain the Empire you must encourage the voluntary spirit. The human heart is not a savings-bank; rich in proportion as nothing is drawn from it. Speaking of the fountain of goodness, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus says, “Ever dig and it will ever well forth.” The only way to run it dry is to bottle it up. So with the voluntary spirit. The

greater the demands you make upon it, the more wonderfully will it rise to meet them. But whatever you do, remember, I beg of you, that the best defence to a country is an army formed, trained, inspired by the idea of the attack. If I have succeeded in bringing prominently to your notice the dangers of the mere defence, then indeed I shall feel I have not written in vain. Once we fall into that pitfall, once we begin to develop (and pay for) "a tremendous potentiality for defence," by just so much must we paralyse our own attack, sacrifice our initiative, and imperil all that we stand for in the world.

Yours sincerely,

IAN HAMILTON.

## APPENDICES

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## APPENDIX I

### TEXT OF THE BILL INTRODUCED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE

A Bill intituled an Act to provide for A.D. 1909.  
National Service in the Territorial Force,  
and for that purpose to amend the Terri-  
torial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907.

BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :—

1.—(1) After the commencement of this Act and subject as hereinafter provided, every male person who is a British subject and resident in the United Kingdom or the Isle of Man, shall be liable during the term of service required under this Act to be trained in the manner and to the extent provided in this Act, and, in case of imminent national danger or great emergency, to be called out for service, as a man of the Territorial Force ; and the provisions of Part II. of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907 (in this Act called the principal Act) shall, sub-

Liability of all British subjects resident in the United Kingdom to be trained and to serve in the Territorial Force.

7 Edw. 7.c.2.

ject to such modifications as are contained in this Act, apply to every person liable to serve by virtue of this Act as if he had been duly enlisted in the Territorial Force for the said term of service.

(2) The term of service required in the case of a person liable to serve by virtue of this Act shall commence on the first day of January next after he attains the age of eighteen years, and shall terminate on the thirty-first day of December next after he attains the age of thirty years :

(3) Nothing in this section shall apply to—

(a) Any person in or belonging to His Majesty's Navy or the Royal Naval Reserve ; or

(b) Any officer of the regular forces, any reserve officer within the meaning of the Royal Warrant regulating the composition of the reserve of officers, or any non-commissioned officer or man belonging to the regular or reserve forces ; or

(c) Any person who has attained the age of eighteen years before the commencement of this Act.

Modifica-  
tions of  
Territorial  
and Reserve  
Forces Act,  
1907.

2.—(1) The provisions of subsection (3) of section nine of the principal Act (which entitle a man of the Territorial Force to be discharged on complying with certain conditions), shall not apply in the case of a person liable to serve by

virtue of this Act, and no such person shall be discharged by his commanding officer under subsection (4) of that section without the consent of the Army Council.

(2) The provisions of proviso (a) to subsection (1) of section nine of the principal Act (which relate to appointments to corps), shall not apply in the case of a person liable to serve by virtue of this Act, but every such person shall on being enrolled in the Territorial Force be appointed to serve in such corps, and posted to such unit in that corps, as the Army Council in the prescribed manner direct :

Provided that, in appointing or posting any person, regard shall, so far as the circumstances of the case admit, be had to his wishes in the matter.

3. Subject to the provisions of this section every person liable to serve by virtue of this Act—

Provisions  
as to  
training.

(1) shall, in the first year of his term of service, undergo training as a recruit, that is to say, be trained at such places within the United Kingdom and at such times as may be prescribed, and, in the case of a man of the infantry branch, for a continuous period of four months, and, in the case of a man in any other branch, for such continuous period not being less than four nor more than six months as may be prescribed ; and



(2) shall, in each of the three years next following the year of his training as a recruit—

(i) be trained for a continuous period of fifteen days at such time and at such places in any part of the United Kingdom as may be prescribed;

(ii) fire the prescribed course of musketry and fulfil the other conditions relating to training prescribed for his branch of the service :

Provided that—

(a) the Army Council may, if they think it desirable so to do in the case of any person, postpone his training as a recruit till the second or third year of his term of service ; and

(b) except during any period when a proclamation ordering the Army Reserve to be called out on permanent service is in force, no person shall be liable to be trained as a recruit after the expiration of the third year of his term of service.

Exemptions  
and disquali-  
fications.

4.—(1) The persons specified in the First and Second Parts of the Schedule to this Act shall be exempt from liability to be trained under this Act (but not from liability to be called out for service in case of imminent national danger or great emergency).

(2) The persons specified in the Third Part of

the Schedule to this Act shall be disqualified for service in the Territorial Force.

(3) Where in any legal proceedings any person claims to be entitled to an exemption under this Act, it shall lie on the person alleging the exemption to prove that he is so entitled.

(4) Every person declared by the Army Council to be disqualified for service in the Territorial Force, and every person who is exempt from training as belonging to one of the classes of persons specified in the Second Part of the Schedule to this Act, shall in each year in which, if he had not been so disqualified or exempt (as the case may be), he would have been liable to be trained under this Act, be liable, if his total income for the year exceeds fifty-two pounds, to pay for the use of His Majesty a sum equal to one per cent. of that total income, and any sum so payable shall be recoverable on complaint to a court of summary jurisdiction by the prescribed officer, and any sums received by him shall be accounted for by him in the prescribed manner.

5. Every person liable to be trained under this Act who without leave lawfully granted, or Punishment for failure to attend for training. such sickness or other reasonable excuse as may be allowed in the prescribed manner, fails to attend for training in pursuance of this Act, or to attend on such occasions as he is required to attend for the purpose of fulfilling the conditions relating to training prescribed for his branch of

the service, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds, or to both, and on summary conviction to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding three months, or to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or to both.

Liability to  
disqualifica-  
tions for  
evasion.

6. If any person liable to serve by virtue of this Act is convicted under section twenty of the principal Act for failure to attend on embodiment, the High Court, or in Scotland the Court of Session, may, on the application of the Army Council, order that he shall either permanently or for any time specified in the order—

- (a) be incapable of holding any office whatsoever in the service of the Crown ;
- (b) be incapable of voting at any parliamentary election ; and
- (c) be disqualified for receiving an old age pension.

Provisions  
as to officers  
of the Terri-  
torial force.

7.—(1) No person shall be recommended to His Majesty for appointment as an officer of the Territorial Force who—

- (a) has not either undergone training as a recruit, or held a commission as an officer of the regular forces for at least one whole year ; and
- (b) does not satisfy the prescribed conditions as to age, educational qualifications,

physical fitness, and any other requirements which may be prescribed.

(2) After the commencement of this Act the provisions of section eight of the principal Act (which relate to first appointments to the lowest rank of officers of the Territorial Force) shall cease to have effect.

8.—(1) The power to make orders and regulations under section seven of the principal Act shall extend to the making of orders and regulations in reference to any of the following matters :

Power to make orders and regulations.

- (a) any matters by this Act authorised or required to be prescribed ;
- (b) the preparation and keeping of lists and registers of persons who are, or will within six months become, liable to serve by virtue of this Act, and the obtaining of returns or particulars from or as to any such persons ;
- (c) the attendance for enrolment of persons liable to serve by virtue of this Act ;
- (d) the notification to persons liable to serve by virtue of this Act of their liabilities under this Act ;
- (e) the assignment to county associations of any powers and duties in connection with the carrying of this Act into effect.

(2) If any person fails to comply with any order or regulation made under this section in reference to attendance for enrolment or in reference to returns or particulars to be obtained



from or as to persons liable, or about to become liable, to serve by virtue of this Act, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a penalty not exceeding five pounds.

(3) Any orders or regulations made under subsection (6) of section seven of the principal Act (which provides for the formation of a reserve division of the Territorial Force) shall not apply to persons liable to serve by virtue of this Act.

Raising of  
Territorial  
Force and  
saving for  
men serving  
at com-  
mencement  
of Act.

9.—(1) After the commencement of this Act voluntary enlistment and re-engagement for the Territorial Force shall cease, and the Territorial Force shall consist of the persons liable to serve by virtue of this Act, and (until they are duly discharged) of the persons constituting the Territorial Force at the commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing in this Act shall affect the terms or conditions of service of any person who is a man of the Territorial Force at the commencement of this Act.

Short title  
construction  
and com-  
mencement.

10.—(1) This Act may be cited as the National Service (Training and Home Defence) Act, 1909, and shall be construed as one with the principal Act, and that Act so far as it relates to the Territorial Force and this Act may be cited together as the Territorial Force Acts, 1907 and 1909.

(2) This Act shall come into operation on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and ten.

## SCHEDULE

## EXEMPTIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS

## PART I

1. Any person who has held a commission as an officer, or has served as a non-commissioned officer or man for not less than three years in the Navy or the Regular Forces.

2. Any person who has served for not less than three years in any police force in the United Kingdom.

3. Any person being the only son of a widow who satisfies the Army Council in the prescribed manner that his mother is wholly or mainly dependent on him for support.

4. Any minister of religion of any denomination.

## PART II

1. Any person who satisfies the Army Council in the prescribed manner that by reason of physical or mental infirmity he is permanently unfitted for training.

2. Any person declared by the Army Council to be exempt as being a person whom it is desirable to exempt in the interests of the public service.

## PART III

Any person declared by the Army Council to be disqualified for service in the Territorial Force as being a criminal, habitual drunkard, or otherwise undesirable by reason of bad character.

## APPENDIX II

### MEMORANDUM OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE ON THE NATIONAL SERVICE (TRAINING AND HOME DEFENCE) BILL

THIS Bill imposes on all male British subjects resident in the United Kingdom the obligation of serving in the Territorial Force between the ages of eighteen and thirty. There are, however, excluded from the operation of the Bill all officers and men of the Navy and Regular Army and of the Naval and Military Reserve Forces (so that the existing voluntary system of raising the Regular Forces will in no way be interfered with), and all persons who reach the age of eighteen before the date on which the Bill comes into operation, viz., 1st January 1910.

Subject to certain modifications, every person who comes under the Bill will be in exactly the same position as a person who now enlists voluntarily into the Territorial Force; and will thus during his term of service have to undergo training and be liable to be called out for home defence in case of imminent national danger, but will be under no liability to serve outside the United Kingdom.

Under the Bill liability to training will not (as is now the case) extend over the whole term of service, but will be limited to four years—normally the first four years of the term, but in exceptional cases the second to the fifth years, or the third to the sixth.

The first year's training will be recruit training, and will be four months for men in the Infantry, and not less than four or more than six months for men in other branches. In each of the three next years, fifteen days' training as well as a course of musketry and attendance at certain drills will be required.

Liability to attend *on embodiment* (i.e. in case of imminent national danger) will remain exactly as it is under the Act of 1907.

The Bill secures absolute equality of treatment as between all classes, inasmuch as under no circumstances will any person be able to buy his discharge or to procure any kind of exemption by means of a money payment.

The Bill provides for the exemption from training of (i) men who have served at least three years in the Army or Navy, ministers of religion, and (in certain cases) only sons of widows ; and (ii) persons physically incapacitated and certain persons employed in public service ; and also for the disqualification of criminals and persons of bad character. All persons in class (ii), and also persons disqualified, will, if their incomes exceed fifty-two pounds per annum, be required, in each of the four years



during which they should have been trained, to pay a special military tax amounting to one per cent of their incomes.

As regards officers, it is proposed that first appointments should only be given to persons who have either been through recruit training or held commissions in the regular army.

After the Bill comes into operation, voluntary enlistment for the Territorial Force will cease, but men now in the Force will complete their current terms of service.

### APPENDIX III

## ESTIMATE BY THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE OF THE NUMBERS AND COST INVOLVED UNDER ITS PROPOSALS

### INTRODUCTORY

IN advocating a great national reform which is essentially based upon the principle of national duty, it has naturally been necessary at first to concentrate most of our efforts upon driving home the justice, necessity, and advantage of the adoption of compulsory military training for home defence. It was therefore thought advisable, in the first instance, to avoid going into minute detail as to the precise periods of training proposed, as to the numbers of men who would be trained, and the cost which would be involved under such proposals.

The advance which has, however, been made in the education of public opinion to the acceptance of the principle of National Service for Home Defence put forward by the League, makes it desirable now to deal with these important practical questions of cost with all necessary detail. This has become all the more urgent in view of the

strangely exaggerated and erroneous figures put forward by official spokesmen.

Recently, both the Earl of Crewe in the House of Lords, and Mr. Haldane in the House of Commons, gave the figure of £20,000,000 as the additional cost of adopting a system of compulsory military training somewhat on the lines of the National Service League. On November 23, 1908, in the debate upon Lord Roberts's great speech in the House of Lords, the Earl of Crewe said : " The existence of that force, trained in the manner in which the Special Reserve is trained, which, I believe, is the demand made, would mean, I suppose, an addition of something like £20,000,000 a year to the Army Estimates." Mr. Haldane, speaking at the City Liberal Club, said that " of course " Lord Roberts did not trouble about the addition of a trifling sum like £20,000,000 to the Army Estimates.

Under these circumstances, the Executive Committee of the League has decided to show in the following pages the probable number of men who would be trained under our proposals ; and, further, the cost of such training, estimated upon two different bases, but in each case upon official figures.

## I

The proposals of the League are as follows :

- 1.—One continuous training of four months for the Infantry (with longer periods, not exceeding two additional months, for the other arms) shall be compulsory on all able-bodied

youths in this country between the ages of 18 and 21, without distinction of class or wealth. Such training shall be followed annually by a musketry course\* and a fortnight's training in camp for the next three years in the ranks of the Territorial Force.

2.—The men thus trained shall be liable to be called out for service in the Territorial Force, for Home Defence only, in a time of grave emergency, so declared by Parliament, up to the age of 30.

## II

### *Numbers*

The number of lads reaching the age of 18 in any one year in the United Kingdom is (according to the census of 1901) about .. .. .						416,000
In estimating the number who would come up for annual Recruit Training we must deduct—						
48 per cent for medical rejections and legal exemptions .. .. .						200,000
Recruits for Navy and Marines .. .. .						8,000
Recruits for Regular Army .. .. .						35,000
Emigrants .. .. .						10,000
Mercantile Marine .. .. .						15,000
						<hr/>
						268,000
Leaving to be trained each year .. .. .						148,000
Say 150,000.						<hr/>
						416,000

In Switzerland the number of medical rejections annually amounts on an average to 47 per cent,

\* NOTE.—With such drills as may be prescribed for the Territorial Force.



and a similar result is experienced in France and Germany. 48 per cent may therefore be taken as a fair estimate for rejections and legal exemptions under our proposals.

The number of British emigrants in 1907 was just under 200,000 (*see* Board of Trade Return for Emigration and Immigration, 1907). We have taken 5 per cent of the number as the proportion of able-bodied youths of 18. The number of British sailors in the Mercantile Marine is about 180,000,\* and it may reasonably be assumed that some 8 per cent of these are youths of about 18 years of age.

Under the above assumptions the numbers trained annually would be as follows, allowing 5 per cent for the annual wastage :

Recruits Training	..	..	..	..	150,000
Training in First Year	..	..		142,000	
Training in Second Year		..		135,000	
Training in Third Year	..	..	.	128,000	
				<hr/>	405,000

or, roughly, 400,000.

### III

#### *Cost*

The cost has been calculated on two bases :

(a) On a proportional cost of the Regular Soldier as given in the Army Estimates (1908-09), with certain modifications.

\* In 1907 the number was 194,848, *see* page 74, "Tables showing the Merchant Shipping in the United Kingdom and the principal Maritime Countries," 1908.

(b) On Mr. Haldane's figures as to the cost of the Special Reserve.

In the case of the recruit undergoing his training a deduction of 6*d.* per day has been made from the pay of a Regular soldier, on the principle that, once home defence is regarded as a national duty incumbent upon all citizens, high and low, rich and poor, it would be absurd to pay the citizen soldier the same rate as is paid to the man for whose services we have at present to compete in the open labour market, and who enters the Army as a profession.

With this exception the cost in both Estimates (a) and (b) is calculated on the cost of the British Regular soldier, admittedly the most expensive soldier in the world, except the United States Regular, and the probable saving due to an army raised on the compulsory system as compared with one raised on a voluntary basis has not been considered.

It should also be borne in mind that in Estimate (a) proportional charges for educational establishments (Royal Military College, Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy, Woolwich), Field-Marshal's pensions, etc. etc., are included, though it is obvious that such charges have little relation to a Territorial Army.

The average period of recruit training has, in both estimates, been taken as five months, the mean between four months for the Infantry and six months for the other arms, and a full staff of

officers and N.C.O.'s (regular) has been allowed for these 150,000 recruits. Moreover, charges are allowed for this staff during the whole year, although the longest period a recruit would be up for training would be six months. This has been done in order that a sufficient staff may be available if it is decided to carry out the training of all the recruits simultaneously. If, however, the training is carried on throughout the year half this staff would be sufficient, and a saving of about £1,000,000 would result thereby, and would have to be deducted from our final estimates.

#### ESTIMATE OF THE SYSTEM OF COMPULSORY TRAINING PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE

##### A

(1) The method on which the following figures have been worked out is that of starting with the assumption that a Territorial Army soldier trained under the National Service League's system will cost, time for time, the same as a Regular soldier. Or, in other words, that if the average cost per head of the Regulars amounts to a certain sum for a year, the average cost per head of the Territorials' training for five months will amount to five-twelfths of that sum. This assumption may not be absolutely accurate, but it appears to be the soundest to start from. It is impossible to calculate, in the abstract, the cost of a Territorial soldier, and in

taking the regular Army as our basis we rest ourselves on existing facts and have a sure standard of comparison.

(2) While, however, the assumption is, in the main, sound, it is evident that modifications and corrections must be introduced into it to meet the conditions of a compulsorily trained Territorial Army. These modifications will act sometimes in the direction of increasing the cost of such an army as compared with the Regulars, sometimes in that of diminishing it. They are dealt with as they arise in the calculations, and they are alluded to here only to make the method of calculation clear.

(3) Working on this system, all the heads of army expenditure summarised on pp. 210 and 211 of the Army Estimates 1908-9, with the exception of those dealing with the Reserves, have been taken, and have been examined one by one, so that under each head the cost of the proposed Territorial Army is calculated at the same rate as the Regulars, subject to the special modifications which each head may seem to call for. From the total cost thus arrived at the savings on existing expenditure which the introduction of our proposed system would lead to have been deducted, and the result would be the net additional cost of that system.

Annual expenditure only is dealt with throughout. Capital cost is not entered upon. The figures are correct to the pounds.



(4) The following numbers, periods of training, etc., are taken as bases :

- (a) The period of training for the first-year recruit is taken as averaging five months, the mean between the four months' training for the Infantry and the six months for the Special Arms.
- (b) The number of recruits undergoing this training is taken at 150,000. This number includes the Territorial N.C.O.'s, but excludes Regular and Territorial Officers and Regular N.C.O.'s, all of whom are dealt with separately.
- (c) The number of Regular Officers and N.C.O.'s required to supervise the five months' training is taken at the following, per 1,000 men :

1 Commanding Officer.

2 Majors.

10 Captains.

1 Adjutant.

1 Quartermaster.

Making a total of 15 officers of various ranks, but practically all above subaltern's rank.

N.C.O.'s :

5 Staff Sergeants.

10 Pay Sergeants.

20 Sergeants.

40 Corporals.

Making a total of 75 N.C.O.'s of all ranks.

(d) The number of Territorial Officers employed in the five months' training is taken at 20 per 1,000 men, all of whom would be subalterns. Opportunities would no doubt be given to Territorial Officers of higher ranks to serve, but in this case they would practically have to be treated as Regulars and would come, therefore, under (c).

(e) The proportion between the Combatant Personnel (Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry) and the Departmental Services (Army Service Corps, Army Medical Department, and Army Ordnance Department) is supposed to be the same in the Territorial Army as in the Regulars. This would divide the 150,000 first-year men into 138,000 Combatant Personnel and 12,000 Departmental Personnel in round numbers.

(f) The number of men forthcoming in the third year of the Annual Repetition Course of fifteen days will be 400,000. The Officers and N.C.O.'s would be supplied from the Territorial Officers and N.C.O.'s already trained, and from (c) the Regular Officers and N.C.O.'s training the first-year recruits, or serving with the Regular troops at home.

(5) The above explains the system and the assumptions on which the calculations have been based. We proceed now to apply these to the

heads of Army Expenditure given on pp. 210-211, Army Estimates, 1908-09.

## I

### *Personnel*

#### (1) *Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry*

##### (a) FIRST YEAR'S TRAINING

*The effective cost—i.e. the cost without any allowance for retired pay or pension, of the Regular Combatant Personnel, exclusive of Officers, of the Home and Colonial Establishment, averages £63 17s. 10d., say £64 per head per year. Taking five-twelfths of this, say £26 15s., for the Territorials training in their first year, 138,000 men will cost £3,691,000.*

To this must be added the cost of the Regular Officers and N.C.O.'s and of the Territorial Officers employed. Under the proportions taken in assumptions (b) and (c) the numbers for 138,000 men will amount to 2,070 Regular Officers, 10,350 Regular N.C.O.'s, and 2,760 Territorial Officers (subalterns). The Regular Officers and N.C.O.'s would be paid at regular rates, including non-effective allowance. For the Territorial Officers £50 for the five months' training has been allowed. The average annual cost of a Regular Officer (including non-effective allowance) is £466 8s. 9d., and this will probably be a fair figure to take for those employed with the Territorials, for neither the Field-Marshal and

## ESTIMATE OF NUMBERS AND COST 173

Generals on the one hand nor the subalterns on the other would be required. At this rate 2,070 officers would cost £965,526.

The annual cost of the Regular N.C.O.'s is more difficult to estimate, as we have no official figures giving us their average annual cost, including non-effective pay. The average annual cost of the Regular N.C.O.'s and men, taken together, is £72 9s. 5d., and the average annual cost of all ranks, officers included, is £84 4s. 6d. We have taken the Regular N.C.O.'s at £80. At this rate 10,350 N.C.O.'s would cost £828,000.

The 2,760 Territorial Officers at £50 would cost £138,000. The gross cost of the first year's training would therefore come to :

138,000 Men at £26 15s.	..	..	£3,691,000
2,070 Regular Officers	..	..	965,526
10,350 Regular N.C.O.'s	..	..	828,000
2,760 Territorial Officers	..	..	138,000
			<hr/>
			<u>£5,622,526</u>

From this, however, a deduction has to be made. The League proposes to pay the Territorial *recruit* 6d. a day less than the Regular. This for 138,000 men for 150 days amounts to £517,500. Deducting this, the cost of the five months' training of the Combatant Personnel in the first year will be £5,105,026.

### *Repetition Courses*

The Territorial soldier in his repetition courses



will receive the same pay as the Regulars. But he will not earn pension. The average annual charge per head for the Regulars of all ranks at home, exclusive of non-effective allowance, is £72 14s. 9d., or £3 for 15 days. At this rate the repetition courses for 400,000 men would cost £1,200,000. As regards Regular officers and N.C.O.'s who might be required, see (f).

The total annual cost for the training of the Combatant Personnel will then be :

First Year's Training .. ..	£5,105,026
Repetition Courses .. ..	1,200,000
	<hr/>
	<u>£6,305,026</u>

(2) *Departmental Personnel*.—The annual cost of the Regular Departmental Personnel is slightly over a sixth of that of the Combatant Personnel. Taking a sixth for our purpose, it adds £1,050,838.

(3) and (4) *The Labour and Instructional Establishments*, as given in the Army Estimates, together add slightly under a fourteenth to the cost of the Combatant Personnel of the Regulars. One-fourteenth of their cost works out to £450,359, and some additional sum would certainly be wanted for special schools of instruction. We take it at £500,000.

(5) *Reserve*.—On this sub-head there is no charge. This concludes the examination of Head I. on p. 210 of the Army Estimates, "Charges for Per-

## ESTIMATE OF NUMBERS AND COST 175

sonnel." For the Territorial Army these charges will amount to :

Combatant Personnel	..	..	£6,305,026
Departmental Personnel	..	..	1,050,838
Labour and Instructional	..	..	500,000
			<hr/>
			<u>£7,855,864</u>

And this sum would cover "all emoluments, allowances, expenses of transport and barrack accommodation and the provision for the Royal Military Academy, Royal Military College, Royal Army Medical College, Recruiting Staff, Prison Establishments, and Regimental and Garrison Schools." (See p. 210 Army Estimates, 1908-09, Vote I.)

*Special Reserves and Territorial Forces.*—This head of the Army Estimates deals with the personnel of the Reserves, Militia, Territorial Forces, Volunteers, etc., and we have no additional cost estimate for any of these. On the contrary, most of these items are matters for deduction and are dealt with later.

### III

#### *Charges for Armaments, Works, Stores, Horses, and Miscellaneous Services*

It is difficult to estimate the cost under this head. With the exception of the item for horses, almost the whole of the charges are for works, buildings, and miscellaneous services which would

not come against a Territorial Army, whose training would be done, in the majority of cases, in camp. As regards the horses, a Home-Defence Army to act in a country as unsuited for cavalry movements as England is, would require few in comparison with Regulars. The proportionate method would, in the case of this head of expenditure, lead to an exaggerated estimate, and the best way will be to take a lump sum. A lump sum of £500,000 has been allowed for this item.

#### IV

##### *Staff and Administration*

Here, again, the increase of expense would be nothing like proportionate to the numbers of the Territorial Force. The present staff deals not only with the Regulars but also with the existing Territorial Army, and a very small addition to its strength, and that mainly in the lower branches, would be all that would be required to enable it to administer the Army proposed by the League. An addition of £200,000 to the existing vote would, in the opinion of the League, be amply sufficient.

##### *Summary of Cost*

This concludes the examination of the various heads of Army Expenditure as given in the Army Estimates, pp. 210-211. The extra cost under each head for the Army recommended by the National

## ESTIMATE OF NUMBERS AND COST 177

Service League will, on the estimates of the preceding paragraphs, amount to :

I.—Personnel (active): Cavalry, Artillery,			
Engineers, and Infantry	..	..	£6,305,026
Departmental Services	..	..	1,050,838
Labour and Instruction	..	..	500,000
II.—Personnel (Reserve)	..	..	Nil
III.—Armaments, Stores, Horses, etc.	..		500,000
IV.—Administration	..	..	200,000
			<hr/>
			£8,555,864
			<hr/>

To this must be added the bounty to be offered to men of the Territorial Force to engage in a Special Reserve to serve with the Regulars abroad in case of war. The strength of this reserve is fixed by Mr. Haldane at 80,000.

Under the old system no difficulty was found in getting Militiamen to engage in a similar Reserve for a bounty of £1 10s. There is no reason why this should not suffice now, as the men will already have done their recruit training. Allowing the same bounty, this, for 80,000 men, comes to £120,000. No expenses will be incurred for the training of this Reserve, as it will be recruited from men who have done their five months' training in the Territorial Army.

The gross cost of the Territorial Force as recommended by the National Service League will therefore amount to £8,675,864.

### *Savings*

Against this must be set off the saving of the cost of the present Territorial Army and of the



present Special Reserve. The cost of the existing Territorial Force when complete has been given by Mr. Haldane (Command Paper No. 3,296, and Supplementary Estimate of May 22, 1907) as £3,515,000 per annum.

The cost of the existing Special Reserve has been given by him as £28 for the recruits in their first year who serve for six months, and £9 for the men in subsequent years. This cost is exclusive of officers. The strength of the Reserve is 80,000, and the engagement in it is for six years. Its normal strength will, therefore, be about 13,500 first-year men and 66,500 men of upwards of one year's service.

Its cost\* will be (without officers):—

13,500 First-year Men at £28	..	..	..	£378,000
66,500 Trained Men at £9	..	..	..	598,500
				<hr/>
				976,500
The Cost of the Officers will add 25% to this	..			244,125
Allowing 75 Non-Commissioned Officers per				
1,000 men at £80 per annum we must add,				
for 13,500 men	..	..	..	81,040
				<hr/>
				<u>£1,301,665</u>

The total savings, therefore, come to :

Territorial Force	..	..	..	..	£3,515,000
Special Reserve	..	..	..	..	1,301,665
					<hr/>
					<u>£4,816,665</u>

\* The Estimates for the Special Reserve in the Army Estimates (1908-9), p. 210, include the cost of the Militia (now in process of absorption).

Deducting this from the gross cost already arrived at of £8,675,864, the net additional annual cost comes to £3,859,199.

It only remains to point out that the figures in this paper apply only to annual cost. Capital Expenditure has not been estimated.

## B

This estimate is based upon the answer given to Mr. Arthur Lee by Mr. Haldane on December 14, 1908, with regard to the cost of the Special Reserve. The answer was as follows :

Mr. Haldane (Haddington): The estimate of £27 19s. 6d. includes barrack accommodation, clothing, pay, bounty, messing allowance, provisions, equipment, arms, ammunition and charges for travelling, fuel, and light, enlistment expenses, barrack stores, and all other expenditure which can be regarded as personal to the man. It does not include any portion of the cost of the establishment of Regular soldiers assigned to a Special Reserve battalion. The average cost of an infantry private of the Special Reserve after his recruit year is about £9 a year.

*Note.*—Mr. Haldane's estimate—£27 19s. 6d.—for recruit's training of six months includes £1 10s. bounty. The actual cost of training for six months would therefore be £26 10s., or £22 for five months.

The estimate £9 per annum after the recruit's drill includes £4 bounty. Deducting this, we get £5 as the cost of the fifteen days' training.

It will be seen from the above that no allowance is made for the Officers and N.C.O.'s who carry out the training of these Special Reserves. Consequently we have to estimate this cost.

Fifteen Regular Officers, seventy-five Regular N.C.O.'s, and twenty Territorial Officers are allowed in this estimate (as in A) per 1,000 men.

We have, therefore, to add the cost of 2,250 Regular Officers, 3,000 Territorial Officers, and 11,250 N.C.O.'s. The cost is calculated as follows :

For each Regular Officer	£466	10	0	} (Army Estimates, including non- effective pay).
For each N.C.O.	..	80	0	
For each Territorial Officer	50	0	0	

The above calculations deal solely with officers required for the recruit training. We must allow thirty-five Territorial Officers per 1,000 men for the fifteen days' annual training of the Territorial Army (400,000). The cost of these officers is calculated at a proportion of £300, which is the effective cost of an officer under the Army Estimates (excluding non-effective vote).

From the total cost of the recruit's training we deduct 6*d.* per diem, as Mr. Haldane's figures given above are based on the pay given at present to a Regular soldier.

Estimated cost of stores, horses, etc., administration, and retaining fee must be added. The same figures are taken as in A. Similar deductions are also made for the present cost of the Territorial Force and Special Reserve.

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These Estimates give the following results :

1.	150,000 Recruits at £22	..	£3,300,000	
	2,250 Regular Officers at			
	£466 10s.	..	1,049,625	
	3,000 Territorial Officers at £50		150,000	
	11,250 N.C.O.'s at £80	..	900,000	
			<hr/>	
			5,399,625	
	Deduct 6d. per diem for 150,000			
	Recruits	..	562,500	
	Total cost of Recruits' Training		<hr/>	£4,837,125
2.	400,000 Territorial Force at £5		2,000,000	
	14,000 Territorial Officers at £13			
	(one twenty-fourth of £300)	..	182,000	
			<hr/>	2,182,000
3.	Armaments, Stores, Horses, etc.	..	500,000	
4.	Administration	..	200,000	
5.	£1 10s. retaining fee for 80,000	..	120,000	
			<hr/>	
			7,839,125	
	Add 10 per cent. for contingencies	..	783,912	
			<hr/>	
	Gross Total	..	8,623,037	
	Deduct Cost of Territorial Force	3,515,000		
	Cost of Special Reserve	1,301,665		
			<hr/>	4,816,665
			<hr/>	
	Net total additional cost of Territorial Army			
	under the League proposals	..	£3,806,372	
			<hr/>	

72, VICTORIA STREET.

1st February 1909.



## APPENDIX IV

### PARLIAMENTARY PAPER (HOUSE OF LORDS, JULY 8, 1909) CONTAINING THE RE- MARKS OF THE FINANCE DEPART- MENT OF THE WAR OFFICE ON THE ESTIMATE OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE

1. THE numbers which a scheme of compulsory service would produce have not been examined, and the estimate of the League in this respect will therefore be accepted for the purposes of this discussion.

2. As regards cost, the relation between the four millions (or rather less) which is the figure arrived at in the League's estimate, and the twenty millions which is spoken of in the pamphlet as the "strangely exaggerated and erroneous figure put forward by official spokesmen," should be made clear at the outset. The latter figure was a very rough estimate of the cost of a force of a million men on a special Reserve basis; that is, trained in barracks for six months on enlistment, paid on the same lines as the Regular Army, all serving on the peace establishment and organized in regimental cadres. The four millions, as is now clear, is the

excess cost, after deducting the present cost of both the Territorial Force and the Special Reserve, of the force proposed by the League. And that force consists not of a million men organised in cadres, but of 150,000 recruits paid 6*d.* a day less than the Regular and trained under canvas, 400,000 trained men organised in cadres, of whom 80,000 replace the present Special Reserve, and 600,000 men in reserve who have passed through the ranks and are liable to be called out, but for whom no arms, clothing equipment or organisation of any kind are provided. The two figures, in fact, have very little relation to one another.

3. The figures arrived at by the two methods of calculation adopted by the League—£3,859,000 and £3,806,000—are strikingly close, and this at first sight appears to confirm their accuracy; but both methods are fallacious and their agreement is a mere coincidence. In Estimate A, on page 10, a rate of £3 per head of all arms and ranks is arrived at as the cost of a repetition course of fifteen days. In Estimate B, on page 14, a rate of £5 is taken as the cost of the same course for the Infantry private—the lowest rank of the least well-paid arm.

4. The fundamental fallacy in Estimate A is the assumption that a soldier trained for fifteen days costs one-twenty-fourth of the annual cost of a soldier trained all the year round. This implies, in effect, that the rifle which lasts the Regular for twelve years will last the Territorialist for centuries;

that the same suit of clothing will last six successive Territorialists, each serving for four years ; that the Territorialists will fire, perhaps, one shillings-worth of ammunition in the year, and so on.

5. The provision for officers is altogether insufficient. Twenty Territorial Subalterns are to be employed for about five months in the training of each 1,000 recruits, at a cost of about £50 each. The sum is quite inadequate, and, apart from this, there is no provision for training the Subalterns themselves, or for Territorial officers of any rank whatever, except that the rate taken for fifteen days' annual training is one-twenty-fourth of the average cost of all ranks of the Regular Army.

6. The £500,000 taken for Armaments, Works, Stores and Horses is also inadequate. Except that it is stated (page 11) that a Home Defence Army to act in a country as unsuited for Cavalry movements as England is would require few horses in comparison with Regulars, there is no indication of what proportion of the several arms of the Service is assumed. Taking the proportion in the present Territorial Force, £500,000 is not enough to provide horses alone for 150,000 recruits training for five months and 400,000 men training for fifteen days, to say nothing of the other items.

7. The rate of £80 taken for a Regular non-commissioned officer of the Permanent Staff is far too low. Corporals would not suffice. Sergeants and Colour-Sergeants, all pensionable and with the right to marry, would be required ; and £150 would not

be too high a rate to take. This single item would add three-quarters of a million to the estimate.

8. In Estimate B the fundamental fallacy is that the cost of an Army is got by multiplying the cost of the individual Infantry private, and the individual officer, with small additions of £700,000 for Armaments, Stores, Horses, &c., and Administration, and £120,000 for retaining fees for the Special Reserve. The value of this method is best tested by applying it to the Regular Army. The annual cost of the Regular Infantry private, on the same lines as the figures for the Special Reserve given in the answer to Mr. Lee (on which the Estimate is based) is £57 10s. The 163,700 men on the Regimental Establishment of the Regular Army at this rate, with 7,225 officers at £300 (the rate taken in the Estimate) would cost eleven and a half millions, whereas the Army Estimates, after deducting pensions, Army Reserve, Special Reserve and Territorial Force, but not deducting the contributions paid by India and the Colonies, amount to eighteen and three-quarter millions, a discrepancy of over seven millions on a force of 171,000.

9. As regards an official estimate of the cost of the scheme, no even roughly reliable figures can be given without full information as to the proportions and establishments of the several arms, with details as to organisation, staff, localities of training, etc. But a mode of obtaining a very rough idea of the minimum cost, upon the best available assumptions, may be indicated.



10. It may be assumed that, broadly speaking, the proposed force would be similar, from an administrative point of view, to the Territorial Force rather than to the Special Reserve, having headquarters and drill halls, but no barracks. It may also be assumed that the proportion of the several arms, and the establishments, would be those obtaining in the Territorial Force ; so that there would be regimental cadres for 550,000 men, all of whom would train for fifteen days, and 150,000 of whom would train for four and a half months longer (making the five months' average recruit training).

11. Now the Territorial Force is estimated to cost normally about £10 a head annually, of which roughly £4 10s. may be assigned to the fortnight's camp (including hire of horses, etc.) and £5 10s. to administration, clothing, equipment, ranges, buildings, etc.

The 550,000 men in the cadres of the proposed force would similarly cost £10 a head, or five and a half millions, for administration, etc., including fifteen days' camp for every man. The four and a half months' extra camp for 150,000 men, making allowance for items which would not increase in proportion to the duration of the training, would cost about six millions.

12. For training staff for recruits the League's estimate allows £2,100,000. Adding three-quarter million for underestimate (*see* paragraph 7), and allowing something for training of recruit officers, this may be put at three millions.

On the other hand, the Territorial is paid 9*d.* a-day (messing allowance) more than the Regular. The League proposes to pay the recruit 6*d.* less than the Regular, and the trained man the same as the Regular. This would give a reduction of 1*s.* 3*d.* a day for 150,000 men for five months, and 9*d.* a day for 400,000 men for fifteen days, say £1,650,000.

13. Thus the cost would be—

Administration and annual training .. ..	£5,500,000
Extra recruit training .. ..	6,000,000
Training staff .. ..	3,000,000
Special Reserve retaining fee (as proposed by the League) .. ..	120,000
	<hr/>
	14,620,000
Less saving on pay .. ..	1,650,000
	<hr/>
	12,970,000

*Deduct* : normal cost of—

Territorial Force .. ..	£3,150,000
Special Reserve .. ..	2,000,000
	<hr/>
	5,150,000
	<hr/>
Increase .. ..	£7,820,000
	<hr/>

Or roughly, eight millions.

14. This estimate, it should be remembered, is purely for the normal annual upkeep of the force, and includes nothing for capital expenditure of any kind. One item in particular must be taken into consideration in this connection. At present the Territorials largely depend, for manœuvre areas

and artillery ranges, on those maintained for the Regulars. These would not suffice to accommodate the larger force proposed. There are no data on which to estimate what the cost of provision would be ; but it would certainly be very large.

## APPENDIX V

### NOTES BY THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE ON WAR OFFICE PAPER "ARMY, JULY 8, 1909"

BEFORE entering on a detailed examination of the criticisms in the War Office Memorandum of July 8, 1909, it may be well to state briefly how the question of the cost of a compulsory system of military training for this country stands at present.

For some years past the National Service League has advocated the adoption of such a system, and has indicated the lines on which it should be conducted. On November 23, 1908, Lord Crewe, speaking in reference to the proposals of the League, stated that the additional cost of compulsory military training would be £20,000,000 a year, and this statement was repeated by Mr. Haldane on the 26th of the same month. As this figure was entirely at variance with the calculations made by the League, the latter drew up in February of this year its estimate of the additional cost of the system it advocated, giving in detail the calculations by which this was arrived at, and the grounds on which it was based. Lord Lucas's paper, now under review, is a criticism of this estimate.



The calculations of the National Service League were, in all cases, based upon official figures, the sources of which were indicated. They were worked out on two different methods, each of which was fully explained, and the results obtained in the two cases tallied with such closeness as to afford a strong presumption that neither was far from the truth. The conclusion to be drawn from them was that if the system recommended by the League were adopted, the increased annual cost, far from being £20,000,000, as stated by the War Office, would not exceed £4,000,000.

The answer of the War Office is to deny the accuracy of the methods adopted by the League, and to produce an amended estimate of its own. In this, the increased annual cost, which ten months ago was put at £20,000,000, has now shrunk to £7,820,000. The immediate effect of the League's calculations has therefore been to reduce the War Office estimate by considerably more than half. We venture to predict that a fuller consideration of them will reduce it still further.

We shall now proceed to examine in detail the various criticisms and arguments in Lord Lucas's paper. These will be taken one by one, and, when quoted, will be distinguished by being placed between inverted commas.

The paper commences by explaining how it was that the War Office promulgated the erroneous estimates to which we have referred. As these are now abandoned, it is not necessary to pursue the

matter further, beyond remarking that the excuses put forward for the error simply show that the War Office had not taken the trouble to make itself acquainted with the system of which it professed to give the cost. We regret to say that the same criticism applies to the paper now before us.

The Memorandum proceeds to state that both the methods of calculation followed by the League "are fallacies, and their agreement is a mere coincidence," and to give reasons for this opinion. The first criticism is :

In Estimate A, on page 10, a rate of £3 per head of all arms and ranks is arrived at as the cost of a repetition course of fifteen days. In Estimate B, on page 14, a rate of £5 is taken as the cost of the same course for the Infantry private.

We thank the War Office for having, in this remark, given an incidental proof of the soundness of the methods we have followed. By Lord Lucas's own statement, in paragraph eleven of his paper, the cost of the Territorial soldier training for fifteen days is put at £4 10s., and, as the Territorial receives 9d. a day more than the Regular, this represents £3 18s. 9d. on a Regular basis. Now the mean between £3 and £5 is £4, which corresponds almost exactly with the War Office figure, and, so far as it differs, does so on the side of excess. A more striking instance of the soundness of our calculations than this unintentional corroboration from official sources could not have been asked for.

The second criticism is :

The fundamental fallacy in Estimate A is that a soldier trained for fifteen days costs one-twenty-fourth of the annual cost of a soldier trained all the year round.

If those who drew up the War Office Paper had read the estimate they were impugning, they would have seen that it is based, not on the assumption stated above, but on the assumption that (we quote the actual words of the estimate) "if the average cost per head of the Regulars amounts to a certain sum for a year, the average cost per head of the Territorial training for five months will amount to five-twelfths of that sum." It is evident that the more nearly the period of training, of which the cost is to be estimated, approaches a year, the more closely will the result of the proportional method of calculation approach accuracy ; and, as the greater portion of the expense is caused by the five months' training in the first year, the difference between the assumption we have made and that which the War Office represents us as having made is very great. Moreover, on December 14, 1908, Mr. Haldane stated in the House of Commons that his estimate of the cost of the training of a Special Reserve recruit for six months was £27 19s. 6d. This included £1 10s. bounty. The League, working on the proportional method, arrived at the conclusion that the cost for five months would be £26 15s. Will the War Office still maintain that our estimate is an underestimate and our method fallacious?

If there is any error in it, it is that we have placed the cost too high rather than too low.

The War Office Memorandum then proceeds :

The provision for officers is altogether insufficient. Twenty Territorial subalterns are to be employed for about five months in the training of each thousand recruits.

We are perfectly certain the War Office would not intentionally misrepresent our proposals, but we can only acquit it of this on the assumption that it has not read them. Would any one imagine from the sentence quoted above that our provision of officers per 1,000 men is not simply "twenty Territorial subalterns," but fifteen Regular officers in addition—namely, a commanding officer, two majors, ten captains, an adjutant, and a quartermaster? We shall always be grateful for the reasoned examination by the War Office of any estimates or proposals we may put forward; but we must ask it in future to refrain from statements so misleading as that the training of 1,000 recruits would be carried out by twenty Territorial subalterns when, as a matter of fact, thirty-five officers are provided for this purpose, and, of these, all in the higher ranks are not Territorials, but Regulars.

The next paragraph states that :

The £500,000 taken for armaments, works, stores, and horses is altogether inadequate. . . . £500,000 is not enough to provide horses for the 150,000 recruits training for five months and 400,000 men training for fifteen days to say nothing of other items."



A large portion of the cost for armaments, works, and stores (Appendix 17, Head III., Army Estimates) is for fortifications, stations abroad, and other expenses which have little to do with a Territorial Army. The total amount taken in Army Estimates (1908-9) for horses for the whole of our Home Forces, Territorials included, was £913,275. We have added £500,000, or more than 50 per cent. We fail to see in what way this allowance is insufficient.

The succeeding criticism is :

The rate of £80 taken for a Regular N.C.O. of the Permanent Staff is far too low. Corporals would not suffice. Sergeants and colour-sergeants, all pensionable and with the right to marry, would be required, and £150 would not be too high a rate to take."

It may be that our estimate on this head is somewhat too low. In putting it forward we expressly stated that this item of cost was "difficult to estimate, as we have no official figures giving us the average annual cost of the Regular N.C.O.'s—including non-effective pay." But if our estimate is too low, that of the War Office is certainly too high. We provided seventy-five N.C.O.'s for 1,000 men, of whom forty were to be corporals. The War Office would have them all sergeants and colour-sergeants. Is not this an arrangement unheard of in any training battalion or depot? Some additions to our estimate under this head may be required, but to nothing like the extent proposed by the War Office.

We have now dealt with all the criticisms of the War Office on our first method of calculation (Estimate A). That on the second method (Estimate B) need not detain us long. It is as follows :

In Estimate B the fundamental fallacy is that the cost of an Army is got by multiplying the cost of the individual Infantry private and the individual officer, with small additions of £700,000 for armaments, stores, horses, etc., and administration, and £120,000 retaining fees for the Special Reserve.

We can only say that in Estimate B we have followed Mr. Haldane's own figures for the average cost of the Special Reserve, composed of 60,000 men and training for six months. If, in these figures, items which ought to have been included have been omitted the fault is not ours.

This concludes our answer to the criticisms in the War Office Paper. We have shown that while the War Office estimates have dwindled from £20,000,000 to £8,000,000, the estimate of the League, arrived at by two different roads, and based on official figures, remains substantially unaffected by the criticisms passed on it. We have further shown that the War Office, both in its original and its amended estimate, has failed to make itself acquainted with what the proposals of the League really are, and has, in consequence, doubtless unintentionally, seriously misrepresented these proposals. We shall now examine into the grounds on which the latest War Office estimate itself rests, with the result that we shall be able to show that

the League's estimate of £4,000,000 is far nearer the truth than the War Office estimate of £8,000,000.

The whole calculation in this latter estimate is based upon the following statement :

The Territorial Force is estimated to cost normally about £10 a head annually, of which, roughly, £4 10s. may be assigned to the fortnight's camp, including hire of horses, etc., and £5 10s. to administration, clothing, equipment, ranges, buildings, etc.

From this annual cost of £10 a head for the Territoria<sup>1</sup> Army, the writer of the paper arrives at £11,500,000 as the cost of the annual training of the force required by the League. But, having done this, he proceeds to add the sum of £3,000,000 more for training staff. On what ground is this addition made? Either the present training staff or the Territorial Army is sufficient, or it is not. If it is sufficient, no addition should be made. If it is not, then this army is at present insufficiently supplied with training staff, and its proper cost has been understated. Lord Lucas must not take his own figures and ours and mix them up to produce a large result. We are ready to start from his basis of an average of £10 a head for the whole of the present Territorial Army, or he can take our basis of £26 15s. for the five months' recruit training, exclusive of staff, and add to it that of the staff. But he must not take his own figure of £10, which includes the staff (as is shown by the fact that in the same calculation the total cost of the present Territorial

Army of 300,000 men is put at £3,150,000), and then, following our method, add to it a sum of £3,000,000 for staff already provided for—a sum which alone equals the whole cost of our present Territorial Army. We really must take exception to this.

When this £3,000,000 is deducted from Lord Lucas's total, the War Office estimate, which, less than a year ago, was £20,000,000, and which has now fallen to less than £8,000,000, comes down to £4,800,000. And the estimate of the League is £4,000,000.

Is it necessary to add more? We think not.

FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE  
NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE,

(*Signed*) GEORGE F. SHEE, *Secretary*.

*July* 10, 1909.



## APPENDIX VI

### SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE BY THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE WAR OFFICE

THE criticisms in the memorandum published by the National Service League on July 10, 1909, so far as they challenge the figures in the War Office Estimate, are briefly dealt with below.

(a) To paragraph 5 of the War Office Paper the League replies :

Would any one imagine from the sentence quoted above that our provision of officers per 1,000 men is not simply "twenty Territorial subalterns," but fifteen Regular officers in addition—namely, a Commanding Officer, two Majors, ten Captains, an Adjutant and a Quartermaster ? We shall always be grateful for the reasoned examination by the War Office of any estimates or proposals we may put forward ; but we must ask it in future to refrain from statements so misleading as that the training of a thousand recruits would be carried out by twenty Territorial subalterns, when, as a matter of fact, thirty-five officers are provided for this purpose, and of these all in the higher ranks are not Territorials, but Regulars.

This misses altogether the point of the War Office criticism, which is that (a) there is no adequate provision for the cost of the Territorial officers

of all ranks necessary for the field units (not depots) ; and (b) that the class of Territorial officer who will do five months' continuous work at drilling recruits for £50 does not exist. This criticism is not affected by the provision of Regular officers for drilling recruits.

(b) To paragraph 6 the League replies :

The total amount taken in Army Estimates (1908-9) for horses for the whole of our Home forces, Territorials included, was £913,275. We have added £500,000, or more than 50 per cent. We fail to see in what way this allowance is insufficient.

This is a misconception. The sum of £913,275 (as the Estimates show) relates to the 31,913 horses on the fixed establishment of the Army, and has nothing to do with the Territorial Force.

(c) To paragraph 7 the League replies :

It may be that our estimate on this head is somewhat too low. In putting it forward we expressly stated that this item of cost was " difficult to estimate," as we have no official figures giving us the average annual cost of the Regular non-commissioned officers, including non-effective pay." But if our estimate is too low, that of the War Office is certainly too high. We provide seventy-five non-commissioned officers for a thousand men, of whom forty were to be corporals. The War Office would have them all sergeants and colour-sergeants. Is not this an arrangement unheard of in any training battalion or depot ? Some additions to our estimate under this head may be required, but to nothing like the extent proposed by the War Office.

It is difficult to divine the conditions under which the League proposes to carry out the training of its recruits. Judged by the proportion of Permanent Staff found necessary for the old Militia and for the Special Reserve, the League's numbers are inadequate. If Territorial conditions are taken, it must be remembered that practically every sergeant-instructor of the Permanent Staff of the Territorials is of colour-sergeant's rank. The cost of pensions is a very serious item.

The addition of three-quarters of a million under this head does not appear excessive.

(d) On paragraphs 11 and 12 the League remarks :

The whole calculation in this latter (the War Office) estimate is based upon the following statement :

"The Territorial Force is estimated to cost normally about £10 a-head annually, of which roughly £4 10s. may be assigned to the fortnight's camp. . . . and £5 10s. to administration . . . etc.

"From this annual cost of £10 a-head for the Territorial Army, the writer of the paper arrives at £11,500,000 as the cost of the annual training of the force required by the League. But, having done this, he proceeds to add the sum of £3,000,000 more for training staff. On what ground is this addition made ? . . . He must not take his own figure of £10, which includes the staff . . . and then (following our method) add to it a sum of £3,000,000 for staff already provided for—a sum which alone equals the whole cost of our present Territorial Army."

Paragraph 12 clearly states that the three millions

relates to training staff *for recruits*. The proportion of training staff allowed to Territorial battalions and other units is not more than sufficient—geographical distribution taken into account—to carry on the training and other duties (correspondence, care of arms, equipment, buildings, etc.) of the units. Certainly no considerable reduction of this staff could be made if recruits were concentrated in training battalions or depots for four to six months' continuous recruit drills. The cost of the training staff for recruits would therefore be additional to the cost, on present lines, of the permanent staff of the units, though apparently the recruit-training staff would be idle for half the year. It is just this mixture of the "Militia" and "Volunteer" principles that makes the system proposed by the League so uneconomical.

C. H.



## APPENDIX VII

### FINANCIAL NOTES ON A POSSIBLE CON- SCRIPT ARMY FOR HOME DEFENCE

1. THESE notes are intended to give a very rough indication, based on such data as are readily available, of the financial results of a reorganisation of the British Army on the following lines :

The present Regular Army to be reduced to the dimensions required for the Indian and Colonial garrisons and the depots at home needed to support them, and the entire cost to be paid by the countries garrisoned. The Special Reserve to be abolished. The Territorial Force to be replaced by a Home Defence Army on German lines, of such a strength as would give on mobilisation a force equal in numbers to the present Territorial Force (assumed to be at its full establishment).

#### NUMBERS IN PEACE AND WAR : GERMAN SYSTEM

2. There are on the peace establishment in Germany 621,000 officers and men of all ranks, including about 504,000 rank and file, and a Reserve (not including the Landwehr and Landsturm) of about 934,000, making 1,438,000 " names on paper "

on mobilisation, besides officers and non-commissioned officers.

3. The present establishment of the Territorial Force is 315,000 officers and men of all ranks, including about 285,000 rank and file. The projected Territorial Reserve would increase the "names on paper" on mobilisation; but a much larger proportion of men would be unfit for immediate service than in a Conscript Army where recruits are taken at military age. For purposes of calculation, I assume that the Reserve would just suffice to replace the immature and untrained and to fill up the casual shortages (differences between establishment and strength) incidental to a voluntary system of recruiting. Taking the "names on paper" of available men as 285,000, this number would be produced on the German system by a peace establishment of 100,000 rank and file, or about 123,000 of all ranks.

#### COMPARATIVE COST PER HEAD, BRITISH AND GERMAN ARMIES

4. There are about 126,000 troops on regimental establishment at home, omitting the Regulars serving with special Reserve units. Their cost, exclusive of reserve pay and pensions, but not deducting the Indian contribution for depot charges, etc., is approximately eleven and a half millions. Including a share of works, stores and administration, the cost of the Army with the Colours at

home may be put at about thirteen millions, or £103 a-head all round.

5. The German estimates, exclusive of colonial troops and pensions, amount to about forty millions for the peace establishment of 621,000 all ranks. The one-year Volunteers, who cost practically nothing,\* have been omitted throughout. This is at the rate of about £64 8s. a-head, or £38 12s. less than the British average.

6. This difference in cost is mainly due to the higher pay and more expensive clothing of the British soldier. There is little difference as regards cost of food. Leaving aside all questions of relative quality and price, the expenditure on food in Germany per man is approximately the same as the British ration with messing allowance.

(a) *Pay*.—The German infantry private gets £3 19s. a year, say 2½*d.* a day, and has to pay stoppages out of it. The English infantry private at home, with proficiency (service) pay, averages 1s. 2*d.* a-day. The difference is 11½*d.* a day, about £17 7s. a-year; or allowing for the British gratuity of £1 a year on discharge and for the greater differences in the pay of Engineers and other arms, say £20 a-year.

(b) *Clothing*.—The British soldier's clothing, including kit allowance, averages £8 a-year. The German soldier's clothing averages about £3 5s. Difference, £4 15s.

7. These two items account for £24 15s. out of

\* They pay even for the use of their equipment.

the difference of £38 12s., leaving £13 17s. still to be accounted for. It is difficult, without making very elaborate comparisons, to trace exactly the differences making up this sum ; but it is to a very large extent explained by the higher pay and larger proportion of upper ranks of regimental officers and non-commissioned officers in the British Army, by the higher standard of comfort in barracks, and by the more liberal allowances to those living outside.

8. Whatever legislation might be passed as regards compulsory service in the ranks, it would always be necessary to pay officers and non-commissioned officers sufficiently to retain them in the Army, and no saving could be looked for in such matters as barrack comfort ; so that there will be no great error in regarding this £13 17s. a head on the total establishment as a permanent excess of cost of a British as compared with a German conscript army, raising the average cost for the British army, modelled and paid on German lines, to £78 5s. a head.

### FINANCIAL RESULTS

9. The Conscript Army of 123,000, all ranks, with the Colours would cost at this rate about £9,625,000 a year. It is assumed, still following the German model, that the Army reservist would get no pay at all.

10. What remained of the present Regular Army in this country would cost the British Exchequer nothing, as the scheme lays down that only the



depots necessary to maintain the over-sea garrisons would remain, and their cost would be paid by India and the Colonies. But in order to form a rough idea of what this implies, it is necessary to make some estimate of what those depots would cost. Taking depots on the present short-service plan, sufficient to give training as nearly as possible equivalent to the present (Home battalion) standard, but without the power of forming fighting units on mobilisation like those of the present Expeditionary Force, the cost would be about £3,170,000.

11. Under the arrangements proposed, the foreign-service army would naturally become a long-service army. This would reduce the size and cost of depots, but, as shown in the memorandum of the Secretary of State on the Estimates of 1908-9, the saving would be more than outbalanced by the increased cost of pensions. These, it is true, would not accrue at once : there would be a period during which there would be a reduction in the annual cost ; but on the other hand there would be heavy initial charges to meet, consequent on the re-organisation ; and ultimately the result as a whole would be an increase of cost.

As the figure is one affecting not British but Indian and Colonial exchequers, it is sufficiently near the mark for present purposes to take the £3,170,000. I do not here pursue the question of how far it is practicable to make the Government of Malta (*e.g.*), or of South Africa, pay the whole

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cost of the troops there and their depots at home.

12. Supposing the change made, we should stand as follows :

## *Present System*

Effective cost of—

Regular troops at home .. ..	£11,550,000
„ in Colonies .. ..	4,140,000
Army Reserve .. ..	1,400,000
Territorial Force .. ..	2,690,000
Special Reserve, etc. .. ..	2,050,000
War Office, etc. .. ..	366,000
Non-effective charges .. ..	3,788,000
Stores and works .. ..	1,500,000
Loan annuities .. ..	1,156,000
	<hr/>
	28,640,000
Repayments by India and Colonies .. ..	1,205,000
	<hr/>
Net Estimates, 1909-10 .. ..	27,435,000
	<hr/>

## *Proposed System*

Regular troops in Colonies .. ..	£4,140,000
„ at home (depots, etc., for India and Colonies) .. ..	3,170,000
Conscript Army .. ..	9,625,000
Non-effective charges .. ..	3,788,000
Loan annuities .. ..	1,156,000
War Office, stores and works (share due to troops abroad) .. ..	620,000
	<hr/>
	22,499,000
Repayments by India and Colonies .. ..	7,930,000
	<hr/>
Net Estimates .. ..	14,569,000
	<hr/>

13. This shows a reduction of £12,866,000 on the net Estimates, of which £6,725,000 is the increase assumed in Indian and Colonial contributions. As these extra payments might equally well be demanded under the present system, the real saving is £6,143,000.

#### POSSIBLE FURTHER FORCES REQUIRED


14. The suggested reorganisation involves the loss of the whole Expeditionary Force, including the present Army Reserve and Special Reserve, and of our Regular Coast Defence troops (Artillery and Engineers). If it were held necessary to provide Regular forces equivalent to these on the German model (including six months' war wastage for the Expeditionary Force) we should require to increase the Home Defence peace establishment taken above (123,000, giving 315,000 on mobilisation) by at least 100,000 men. This would add about £7,825,000 to the Estimates, or over a million and a half more than the amount saved under paragraph 13.

All the above figures assume the pay of the British conscript reduced to the German level of 2½*d.* a day.

C. H.







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